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RECLAIMING THE EQUITABLE HERITAGE  
OF HABEAS 
Erica Hashimoto 
ABSTRACT—Equity runs through the law of habeas corpus. Throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, prisoners in England sought the 
Great Writ primarily from a common law court—the Court of King’s 
Bench—but that court’s exercise of power to issue the writ was built 
around equitable principles. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising 
that modern-day habeas law draws deeply on traditional equitable 
considerations. Criticism of current habeas doctrine centers on the risk that 
its rules—and particularly the five gatekeeping doctrines that preclude 
consideration of claims—produce unfair results. But in fact, four of these 
five bars exhibit significant equitable characteristics. The sole outlier, the 
Supreme Court’s retroactivity bar, strictly prohibits relief when an 
applicant relies on a new rule of constitutional procedure, without regard to 
the blamelessness of the applicant’s conduct or the nature of the claim. 
The nonequitable nature of the retroactivity bar causes both individual 
and institutional harms. Of particular importance, because it operates 
irrespective of how compelling the individual claim of error may be, it 
blocks the opportunity to secure relief on claims in approximately one 
quarter of all capital habeas cases. The nonretroactivity rule also makes it 
impossible for courts to recognize new rights applicable to collateral 
proceedings, no matter how sound such new rights might be. 
This Article argues that the Supreme Court should modify its 
retroactivity doctrine to reflect equity’s traditions. In particular, the Court 
should adopt three individualized equitable exceptions to the now-absolute 
retroactivity bar that take account of applicants’ conduct in pursuing 
claims, the merits of the claims and the stakes involved, and the 
unavailability of alternative remedies. These exceptions might not alleviate 
all of the inequities created by the nonretroactivity rule. They would, 
however, bring it more in line with its four companion habeas bars, 
providing a measure of coherence to these gatekeeping doctrines and 
reconnecting the nonretroactivity rule with the writ’s deep equitable roots. 
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The post-conviction habeas corpus remedy has long resided in a legal 
no-man’s-land.1 It involves rulings about criminal process in the context of 
a civil proceeding. It empowers lower federal courts to review state court 
convictions and even state supreme court judgments.2 And despite the 
writ’s deep equitable roots, the Supreme Court and Congress in recent 
decades have curtailed its availability in ways that strike many as 
inequitable.3 
Perhaps as a result, the modern doctrine has been described as “an 
intellectual disaster area”4 and as having “a Rube Goldberg quality that 
frustrates all efforts to give it logical coherence.”5 In particular, the Court 
and Congress have imposed five procedural gatekeeping requirements that, 
unless the claim falls within a delineated exception, operate as affirmative 
defenses, completely barring federal courts from reaching the merits of 
 
1 This Article focuses almost exclusively on the post-conviction habeas remedy. The Court’s recent 
pre-conviction cases—many of which stem from litigation brought by the detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay—are discussed only to the extent that they may have affected the Court’s analysis in post-
conviction cases. 
2 Congress has codified the modern statutory habeas rules in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101, 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217, 1220 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  
3 See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 415, 415, 449 (1991) (“In recent years, a series of United States Supreme Court decisions 
has restricted access by state prisoners to the Great Writ.”).  
4 Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1731, 1756 (2000). 
5 Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65, 
109. 
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habeas claims: (1) a rule that applicants must exhaust their claims in state 
court,6 (2) a procedural default doctrine that generally bars a remedy if the 
state court ruling rests on an independent state procedural ground,7 (3) an 
abuse of the writ doctrine that precludes relief for most successive 
petitions,8 (4) a time limitations rule that requires prompt filing,9 and (5) the 
Teague rule preventing consideration of claims that rely on “new rules” of 
constitutional procedure.10 As these five companion doctrines have taken 
hold, scholars have searched in vain for sound overarching principles 
binding them together.11 
The Court’s most frequently expressed justifications for these bars, 
intoned almost as a mantra, rest on concerns about comity, federalism, and 
finality.12 But this now-familiar rhetoric fails, in part because virtually any 
limitation on the habeas remedy (including its complete elimination) would 
further these aims. No less importantly, the Court has not satisfactorily 
explained how these concerns are connected to the applicability of the writ. 
Although the Court has suggested that comity, federalism, and finality are 
connected with “equitable principles,”13 it has never explained why that is 
so. 
 
6 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006). This Article uses the term “applicant” to denote the plaintiff in 
a federal habeas action because the habeas statute uses that term. 
7 See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012) (noting that under the procedural 
default rules, “a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a 
state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule”). 
8 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 
9 Id. § 2244(d). 
10 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
11 See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 152–
54 (1994) (identifying four potential theories); Yackle, supra note 4 (noting that scholars have 
advocated varying theories to explain the conceptual foundation for habeas law). 
12 See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (explaining that the purpose of the 
statutory habeas bars is to “further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism” (quoting Williams 
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000))); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492–93 (1991) (noting that 
comity and federalism concerns shape reticence about requiring the state to defend “second or 
subsequent habeas proceeding[s] on grounds not even raised in the first petition”); Teague, 489 U.S. at 
308–10 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (justifying the nonretroactivity rule by noting that “interests of 
comity and finality must . . . be considered in determining the proper scope of habeas review”); see also 
Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 577–79 (1993) (discussing the various 
theories on the proper scope of the habeas writ and their differing invocation of finality, comity, and 
federalism interests); Angela Ellis, Note, “Is Innocence Irrelevant” to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations? 
Avoiding a Miscarriage of Justice in Federal Habeas Corpus, 56 VILL. L. REV. 129, 138 n.48 (2011) 
(“Commentators generally agree that [the Court’s] decisions significantly altered the scope of habeas 
review in response to concerns for federalism, comity, and finality.”).  
13 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 716–17 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that habeas jurisdiction, including the exhaustion and nonretroactivity 
requirements, “is tempered by the restraints that accompany the exercise of equitable discretion”); 
McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 493 (noting that both the abuse of the writ and procedural default doctrines 
“invoke equitable principles to define the court’s discretion”). 
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In short, the Court’s loose talk of comity, federalism, and finality 
offers a wholly inadequate explanation for the habeas gatekeeping 
mechanisms it has fashioned. Even worse, it has obscured the importance 
of habeas’s equitable roots to current doctrine.14 Indeed, four of the five 
bars—abuse of the writ, procedural default, exhaustion, and timeliness—
share features that correspond with the remedy’s historical equitable 
origins. First, all four adhere to traditional equitable defenses, including 
unclean hands, laches, and the availability of an adequate remedy at law. 
Second, each doctrine focuses on the applicant’s conduct, taking account of 
whether delays and failures to raise claims were justifiable or not. Finally, 
in keeping with traditional equitable notions, the Court has fashioned 
ameliorative exceptions to each bar that respond to case-specific 
considerations of fairness.15 
The Court’s Teague retroactivity bar—which eliminates the habeas 
remedy for the violation of any new constitutional procedural rule 
recognized after the applicant’s conviction became final16—does not share 
these critical characteristics. It has no connection to any traditional 
equitable doctrine, it does not respond to any individual blameworthy 
conduct, and it does not give way based on considerations of individual 
circumstances, regardless of how compelling they are. Empirical evidence 
demonstrates that capital cases represent a disproportionate percentage of 
Teague-barred claims, making the retroactivity bar’s absence of any 
equitable characteristics particularly problematic.17 This Article both 
documents and responds to the nonequitable nature of the Court’s 
current—and distinctively rigid—retroactivity bar. In particular, it urges 
the Court to refashion its retroactivity bar by drawing on traditional equity 
practices to create exceptions that take account of individual burdens and 
blame. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the historical 
equitable ancestry of the habeas remedy and provides an overview of the 
current habeas doctrine’s gatekeeping requirements. Part II analyzes the 
ways in which four of those gatekeeping limitations draw on the remedy’s 
equitable origins. Part III turns to the Court’s nonretroactivity doctrine, its 
development, and the ways in which it abandons the equitable principles 
 
14 The Court frequently has invoked “equitable principles” in its decisions, but virtually all of those 
references involve only the state’s federalism, comity, and finality concerns. See, e.g., McCleskey, 499 
U.S. at 492–93; Teague, 489 U.S. at 308–10 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 
509, 514–16 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80–82 (1977).  
15 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 493–94.  
16 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
17 See NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: 
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 45, 49 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (setting forth data demonstrating that almost 24% of capital habeas 
cases had at least one Teague-barred claim, while less than 1% of the noncapital claims had a Teague-
barred claim).  
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present in the other gatekeeping limitations. Finally, Part IV offers concrete 
proposals that would enable the Court to introduce equity into the 
retroactivity bar. 
I. THE HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS AND  
ITS GATEKEEPING LIMITATIONS 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided an equitable remedy to prisoners 
“in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States.”18 In 
keeping with English common law, the Court held that the statute 
authorized relief from confinement where the court imposing confinement 
lacked jurisdiction or where the Executive had detained the prisoner 
without legal process.19 Over the next 150 years, Congress and the Supreme 
Court expanded the scope of the habeas remedy in two major ways. First, 
in 1867, Congress authorized federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus 
to prisoners in state (as well as federal) custody.20 Second, the Court held 
that a federal writ of habeas corpus could be granted to any prisoner 
claiming that a court in an earlier criminal proceeding had disregarded his 
constitutional rights and that “the writ is the only effective means of 
preserving his rights.”21 
These substantive expansions were consistent with the historically 
broad, equitable nature of the writ—both in England and in the United 
States. Professor Paul Halliday’s careful historical account of the use of 
habeas corpus by the King’s Bench in England demonstrates that, although 
the King’s Bench was a common law court, it used habeas in a way that 
“was equitable in everything but name.”22 In particular, the King’s Bench 
could “plug any existing gaps in law to right all wrongs.”23 The habeas 
 
18 Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. As other scholars have noted, the federal statutory habeas remedy 
merely supplemented the common law habeas remedy available in state courts, and even post-Erie, the 
federal courts also for many years created a federal “common law” of habeas. See, e.g., ERIC M. 
FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001); Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Common-Law Habeas and the Separation of Powers, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 43–47 (2010). As 
discussed below, many of the federal habeas gatekeeping bars initially arose as part of that common law 
tradition. 
19 E.g., McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 478; Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 487 n.120 (1963); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse 
Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
1997, 2041–42 (1992); Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas 
Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 575 (2009).  
20 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; see also McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 478 (discussing 
the statutory and judicial forces that expanded the scope of the writ). 
21 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1942) (per curiam). This Article uses the male 
pronoun for habeas applicants because the overwhelming majority of applicants in federal court are 
male. See KING ET AL., supra note 17, at 19 (concluding that 3.8% of noncapital applicants and 1.1% of 
capital applicants in the sample were women). 
22 PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 87 (2010).  
23 Id.  
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remedy also took account of petitioners’ individual circumstances, “rather 
than imposing obedience to a set of rules inscribed in precedents.”24 This 
flexibility of the King’s Bench habeas remedy, and its sensitivity to the 
particular facts of the petitioner’s case, demonstrated the equitable nature 
of the remedy.25 
Professor Halliday’s research highlights several features about the 
issuance of the writs. First, and perhaps most important, “was the central 
fact of habeas corpus: that a judge should hear the sighs of all prisoners, 
regardless of where, how, or by whom they were held.”26 Second, the 
justices of the King’s Bench freely used the common law writ to review 
imprisonment, even after Parliament passed the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act.27 
As a result, the writ continued to evolve as an instrument fine-tuned by 
judges and largely uninfluenced by parliamentary intervention. Finally, the 
power of the King’s Bench to issue the writ emanated from the King’s 
prerogative—the highly discretionary power the King wielded over his 
subjects—rather than from entrenched ideas about particular protections of 
individual liberty.28 All of those to whom the King delegated power held 
the King’s prerogative—“[w]hether a sheriff or common jailer, a tipstaff or 
messenger, whoever held the custody of one of the [K]ing’s subjects did so 
by the prerogative.”29 Given their distinctly close relation to the King,30 the 
King’s Bench justices had the prerogative to inspect the work of all others 
to whom the King had delegated authority to imprison. 
Use of the habeas remedy by the King’s Bench peaked in 1789,31 a 
significant fact because the Court has made clear that the protection of the 
writ in 1789 represents the “absolute minimum” for the current writ’s 
protection under the Suspension Clause.32 In the years leading up to 1789, 
the justices of the King’s Bench increasingly used common law writs of 
habeas corpus to assert their authority to review imprisonment and release 
those unlawfully detained.33 To be sure, many of those released had been 
imprisoned prior to conviction, but particularly in the early 17th century, a 
 
24 Id. at 102.  
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).  
27 Id. at 239; Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 953–57 
(2011) (book review). 
28 HALLIDAY, supra note 22, at 7, 75. 
29 Id. at 74. 
30 Id. at 75 (describing the close proximity of the King’s Bench justices to the King, both “legally 
as well as literally”). 
31 Id. at 314; see also Vladeck, supra note 27, at 957–58 (characterizing 1777 to 1789 as “the high-
water mark of habeas in England”). Professor Halliday’s book draws from his review of every habeas 
corpus ad subjiciendum writ issued from the King’s Bench every fourth year from 1502–1798. 
HALLIDAY, supra note 22, app. at 319. 
32 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). 
33 HALLIDAY, supra note 22, at 309–10. 
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significant percentage of the writs were issued post-conviction.34 In short, 
Professor Halliday’s historical account makes clear that the habeas writ in 
England was rooted in equitable principles, used broadly, and marked by 
flexibility rather than rigid and restrictive rules.35 
As the substantive reach of the habeas remedy expanded in the United 
States, however, the Supreme Court and then Congress set forth a series of 
procedural limitations—in particular, five gatekeeping requirements—that 
prevent federal courts from reaching the merits of habeas claims. The Court 
and Congress clearly have the authority to adopt such limitations. Congress 
determines the contours of the habeas remedy, and therefore can 
procedurally limit access to it,36 and the Court for many years has exercised 
broad discretion in fashioning the remedy as part of its authority to 
interpret the habeas statute, crafting limitations on its availability even 
where it has jurisdiction.37 Less clear is whether the gatekeeping 
requirements that Congress and the Court have developed make a coherent 
and justifiable body of doctrine. 
Before turning to that matter, a brief description of each of the five 
gatekeeping requirements is in order. The five bars mandate dismissal of 
habeas claims38 for: (1) failure to exhaust state remedies, (2) procedural 
default of an issue before the state court, (3) abuse of the writ through 
second or successive petitions, (4) failure to timely file, and 
(5) nonretroactivity. There are additional provisions limiting the 
availability of the habeas remedy, including AEDPA’s requirement of 
deference to state court findings,39 and the version of the harmless error 
 
34 Id. app. at 328 (“When summary convictions are included in the analysis—the means by which 
most misdemeanants were convicted—post-conviction writs peaked in the early to middle part of the 
seventeenth century, as overall use of habeas corpus for misdemeanors peaked. For the period 1600–
1650, nearly one-third (31%) of writs issued after conviction.”). 
35 Id. at 100–01. 
36 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508–10 (1953) (deferring to Congress’s authority to 
determine the availability of habeas relief). Of course, Congress’s power to shape the writ is cabined by 
the Constitution’s prohibition on suspending the writ. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also Felker v. 
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654, 656 (1996) (holding that AEDPA’s limitations on second or successive 
petitions do not violate the Suspension Clause); Kent S. Sheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and 
the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 932 (1998) (noting the Court’s power to strike down 
congressional enactments that violate the Suspension Clause). 
37 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 278 (2008) (noting that the nonretroactivity rule from 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308–10 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion), is “an exercise of this 
Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas statute”); Teague, 489 U.S. at 308 (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion) (situating the nonretroactivity rule within the corpus of the Court-created habeas rules 
designed to preserve comity and finality); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85–91 (1977) (declining 
to grant habeas relief because of the equitable and prudential considerations implicated by procedural 
default). 
38 Each of the bars (with the possible exception of the Teague bar) permits consideration of claims 
under certain circumstances. See infra Parts II.C, III.C.  
39 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (2006). 
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standard that governs habeas relief for constitutional error.40 But those are 
categorically different from the gatekeeping requirements in that they do 
not altogether bar the courts from reaching the merits of habeas claims; 
instead, they simply set forth standards for considering those claims. 
Accordingly, the scope of this Article is limited to the five gatekeeping 
requirements. 
The history of the first requirement, that applicants first exhaust their 
remedies in state court, dates back at least to Ex Parte Royall in 1886.41 The 
Court justified this requirement on the grounds that it protects “the state 
courts’ role in the enforcement of federal law”42 and that it ensures the 
development of a more complete record before applicants present their 
claims in federal court.43 Congress later codified this requirement so that a 
habeas writ “shall not be granted unless . . . the applicant has exhausted the 
remedies available in the courts of the State,” or unless the state either 
lacks any corrective process or the process is “ineffective to protect the 
rights of the applicant.”44 The statute also specifies that “[a]n applicant 
shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts 
of the State . . . if he has the right under law of the State to raise, by any 
available procedure, the question presented,”45 thereby assuring that federal 
courts cannot reach claims where a state remedy is available. 
Under the second bar—the procedural default doctrine—if an 
applicant fails to comply with a state’s procedural rules and the state court 
therefore does not decide the merits of his claims, a federal habeas court 
cannot reach the merits of those claims.46 For instance, if an applicant did 
not comply with a state’s contemporaneous objection rule47 or its time 
limitations for filing appeals,48 and the state court, relying on its own rules, 
refused to consider the merits of the claims he raises on habeas, the federal 
 
40 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (holding that the standard on habeas is 
whether the constitutional error had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 
jury’s verdict,” rather than whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (quoting Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946))).  
41 See 117 U.S. 241, 250–52 (1886).  
42 Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). 
43 Id. at 519. 
44 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 
45 Id. § 2254(c). 
46 See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012) (noting that, under the procedural 
default rules, “a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a 
state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule”); Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747–48, 750 (1991) (noting that a court will not hear a claim defaulted under 
state procedural rules absent cause and actual prejudice or a finding that “failure to consider the claims 
will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice”).  
47 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977) (refusing to grant habeas relief because 
the petitioner’s failure to timely object under the state’s contemporaneous objection rule barred federal 
review).  
48 See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750–51, 757 (barring habeas claim).  
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habeas court cannot reach the merits of those claims.49 Unlike several of the 
other habeas bars, Congress has never codified the procedural default rule. 
Third, the abuse of the writ doctrine bars federal habeas courts from 
considering claims raised in second or successive habeas petitions. 
Although the Court has rejected a strict res judicata rule to bar claims that 
were or might have been asserted in a previous petition,50 it has imposed res 
judicata-like limits on petitioners by way of this doctrine.51 The Court first 
explicitly recognized this rule in 1924.52 Congress then codified it in 1948,53 
and expanded the limits on filing successive petitions when it passed 
AEDPA in 1996.54 
Fourth, AEDPA imposes a one-year filing deadline on habeas claims.55 
Not surprisingly, the Court had not previously adopted a statute of 
limitations for habeas actions.56 Even so, AEDPA’s limitation built on a 
rule that permitted courts to dismiss petitions for unreasonable delay if it 
appeared that the State was “prejudiced in its ability to respond to the 
petition by delay in its filing.”57 
Finally, the retroactivity rule announced in Teague v. Lane prohibits 
habeas courts from applying any new constitutional criminal procedure rule 
 
49 As discussed below, there is an exception if the applicant can establish “cause” for the default 
and “prejudice” from the failure to consider his claims. See infra Part II.C.  
50 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953). 
51 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 480–82 (1991) (distinguishing the doctrine from res 
judicata); Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 241 (1924) (upholding dismissal of habeas petition 
because the applicant already had litigated the issue and been denied relief). 
52 See, e.g., Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230–32 (1924); Wong Doo, 265 U.S. at 241. 
53 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1948) (providing that federal courts need not entertain successive petitions if 
“the petition presents no new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and the judge or court is 
satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such an inquiry”); Karen C. Lapidus, Note, Rose 
v. Lundy and Rule 9(b): Will the Court Abuse the Great Writ?, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 335, 352 n.106 
(1983).  
54 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), amended by AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 106, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220–21 
(1996). AEDPA amendments set forth an elaborate gatekeeping mechanism for determining whether a 
successive petition should be barred or falls within one of the exceptions. An applicant filing a second 
or successive petition must first file a motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district 
court to consider the petition, which requires the applicant to make a “prima facie showing” that the 
petition falls within one of the exceptions. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C). Even if the court of appeals authorizes 
the district court to consider the petition, moreover, the district court has an independent obligation to 
ensure that “the claim satisfies the requirements” related to second and successive petitions. Id. 
§ 2244(b)(4). 
55 Id. § 2244(d), amended by AEDPA §§ 101, 110. The one-year period generally begins when the 
conviction becomes final and excludes any time during which a “properly filed application for State 
post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending,” although the statute also lists several other 
narrow circumstances that can trigger a later start to the limitations period. Id. 
56 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 n.1 (2006). 
57 See RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS § 9(a) 
(1977); Day, 547 U.S. at 214–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that prior to the 1977 adoption of the 
unreasonable delay rule, “lower courts regularly entertained petitions filed after even extraordinary 
delays” such as twenty-four, thirty-six, and forty years). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
148 
if the applicant’s conviction had become final before the Court announced 
that “new rule.”58 The Court observed that “[i]t is admittedly often difficult 
to determine when a case announces a new rule,”59 but it has gone on to 
give the “new rule” label a broad reach, declaring it applicable so long as 
the rule was “susceptible to debate among reasonable minds” when the 
Court issued its opinion.60 Like the procedural default rule (and unlike the 
exhaustion and abuse of the writ doctrines), Congress has not expressly 
codified the Teague doctrine.61 
In justifying each of these five limitations on the scope of the habeas 
writ, the Court—and sometimes Congress as well—has emphasized the 
importance of “equitable principles.”62 But instead of invoking traditional 
equitable concepts such as laches or unclean hands, the Court has rested its 
rules on the basis of three “prudential concerns”—comity, federalism, and 
interests in finality.63 
The Court’s rote invocation of these interests ultimately is 
unsatisfactory for two related reasons. As an initial matter, a desire to 
promote interests in comity, federalism, and finality cannot suffice to 
justify these specific limitations since every rule limiting the availability of 
 
58 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
59 Id. at 301; see also Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 423, 438–47, 459–60 (1994) (criticizing the Court’s broad and unwieldy definition of new 
rules).  
60 Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990). The Court also observed that lower court 
disagreement on the issue could demonstrate the rule’s newness. Id.  
61 See Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that 
“AEDPA did not codify Teague, and . . . the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct”); Larry W. 
Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 416 (1996) (arguing that 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) “does not incorporate the Supreme Court’s Teague doctrine in so many words, 
despite available illustrations of how that might be done”). But see generally Note, Rewriting the Great 
Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1868, 1882–85 (1997) (reading 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) as “track[ing] the general rule of Teague, albeit in 
a somewhat roundabout way” and interpreting § 2254(d)(1) as codifying at least one of the Teague 
exceptions). 
62 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 716–17 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that habeas jurisdiction, including the exhaustion and nonretroactivity 
requirements, “is tempered by the restraints that accompany the exercise of equitable discretion”); 
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (noting that both the abuse of the writ and procedural 
default doctrines “invoke equitable principles to define the court’s discretion”).  
63 See, e.g., McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 492–93 (noting that comity, finality, and federalism concerns 
shape reticence about “second or subsequent habeas proceeding[s] on grounds not even raised in the 
first petition”); Teague, 489 U.S. at 308–10 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (justifying the 
nonretroactivity rule by noting that “interests of comity and finality must . . . be considered in 
determining the proper scope of habeas review”); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 514–16 (1982) (noting 
finality and comity arguments for exhaustion doctrine); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80–82 
(1977) (noting federalism and comity arguments for procedural default doctrine). As discussed below, 
the Court recently has invoked traditional equitable principles in its decisions, but that is only a very 
recent development. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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habeas relief will promote those interests.64 For example, a state could ask 
the Court, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, to adopt a new 
gatekeeping rule that conditions access to habeas on an applicant’s 
obtaining certification from the state that his claims have merit. Such a rule 
would greatly promote the state’s interests in comity, federalism, and 
finality. By severely curtailing the federal habeas remedy, it would promote 
finality, and it would promote federalism and comity by respecting the 
state’s own assessment of the merits of applicants’ claims. Indeed, 
eliminating the federal habeas remedy altogether for those convicted in 
state courts would most fully protect these three state interests. As a result, 
the gatekeeping mechanisms described above cannot be justified simply on 
the grounds that they further these state interests. 
Second, justifying these limitations based on state interests in comity, 
federalism, and finality fails to honor the habeas writ’s deep equitable 
roots. Although values of comity, federalism, and finality might carry 
weight in an equitable balance,65 they cannot stand alone. Even more 
important, these considerations stray from the core equitable principle that 
“equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.”66 Put simply, comity, 
federalism, and finality at most may constitute interests for habeas courts to 
 
64 See, e.g., McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491 (noting that the writ “strikes at finality”); Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he Great 
Writ entails significant costs[,] [t]he most significant of [which] is the cost to finality . . . .”); Engle v. 
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982) (“[T]he writ undermines the usual principles of finality of litigation.”); 
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690–92 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (decrying the destruction of finality wrought by habeas writs).  
65 Scholars recently have pointed to the dearth of any evidence that courts prior to the mid-
nineteenth century “balanced” the equities before awarding equitable relief. See PETER CHARLES 
HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 152 (1990) 
(concluding that the first American equitable balancing case was decided in 1868); Jared A. Goldstein, 
Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485, 492 (2010) (“English and American 
courts in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries neither spoke of balancing the 
equities nor employed a balancing approach in deciding whether to grant injunctions.”). Instead, prior to 
1868, courts appear to have ordered equitable relief only where the petitioner had a meritorious case 
and none of the traditional equitable reasons for denying relief—such as unclean hands, availability of 
relief at law, laches, or estoppel—applied. Id. at 492–93.  
More modern cases, however, suggest that equitable courts should balance the interests of the 
parties in determining whether to grant relief. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201 (1973) 
(“In equity, as nowhere else, courts eschew rigid absolutes and look to the practical realities and 
necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests . . . .”).  
66 E.g., Key Corporate Capital, Inc. v. Cnty. of Beaufort, 602 S.E.2d 104, 107 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
(quoting Lane v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 145 S.E. 196, 207 (S.C. 1928)); Unity Tel. Co. v. Design Serv. Co. 
of N.Y., 179 A.2d 804, 811 (Me. 1962); Lane, 145 S.E. at 207. Of course, to order relief equity courts 
needed to have jurisdiction, and the remedy traditionally was subject to certain defenses. First State 
Bank of Clermont v. Fitch, 141 So. 299, 301 (Fla. 1932) (characterizing that maxim as “necessarily 
subordinate to positive principles” and noting that it “cannot be applied either to subvert established 
rules of law or to give the courts a jurisdiction hitherto unknown”). But comity and federalism 
considerations never lay at the heart of equity. 
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consider, but they cannot alone justify mechanical rules barring access to 
the equitable remedy. 
II. THE EQUITABLE ROOTS OF (MOST OF) THE HABEAS BARS 
The Supreme Court’s rote invocation of comity, finality, and 
federalism to justify the gatekeeping limitations on the writ of habeas 
corpus does not reflect the equitable roots of the habeas doctrine. In 
practice, though, most of these limitations reflect attentiveness to equitable 
principles.67 In fact, traditional equitable principles have shaped those 
limitations and the resulting scope of the writ.68 For this reason, much of 
the doctrine not only is coherent but also historically well-grounded. 
Indeed, perhaps because of the Court’s recognition of equitable principles 
in pre-conviction cases, the Court very recently has begun recognizing 
traditional equitable doctrines to justify its decisions in post-conviction 
cases.69 
In particular, four of the five gatekeeping bars—exhaustion, 
procedural default, abuse of the writ, and the statute of limitations in 
AEDPA—share three characteristics demonstrating their equitable origins. 
First, each of these four limitations builds on traditional equitable defenses 
recognized in many fields of law. Second, in keeping with equitable 
traditions, each of these limitations focuses on the applicant’s conduct. 
Finally, each has individualized exceptions based on equitable 
considerations. On each of these counts, Teague’s nonretroactivity doctrine 
stands strikingly alone. This is best explained by taking a close look at the 
four other gatekeeping bars with which the Teague rule contrasts. 
 
67 Of course, the Court has made clear that despite its equitable roots, the habeas remedy still is 
governed by a “body of statutes, rules, and precedents.” Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996). 
68 See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (noting that the procedural default 
rules reflect equitable principles); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (noting that “equitable principles have traditionally governed the substantive law of 
habeas corpus”); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995) (“[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an 
equitable remedy.”); McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 489 (noting that the abuse of the writ doctrine “refers to a 
complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, 
statutory developments, and judicial decisions”); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 451 (1986) 
(Powell, J., plurality opinion) (rejecting “that federal courts no longer must consider the ‘ends of 
justice’ before dismissing a successive petition”); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1963) 
(holding that a habeas court must adjudicate even a successive petition when required to do so by the 
“ends of justice”). 
69 See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318 (noting the equitable origins of the procedural default doctrine); 
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562 (holding that equitable tolling applies to AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
because it was hesitant to interpret “AEDPA’s statutory silence as indicating a congressional intent to 
close courthouse doors that a strong equitable claim would ordinarily keep open”).  
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A. Habeas Bars and Their Traditional Equitable Corollaries 
Exhaustion, procedural default, abuse of the writ, and the time-based 
limitation share a common trait: each parallels traditional equitable 
defenses. The rationale behind the exhaustion doctrine mirrors the 
traditional withholding of equitable relief when an applicant has an 
“adequate remedy at law.” The procedural default doctrine similarly tracks 
the traditional equitable unclean hands defense. The rationale for the abuse 
of the writ doctrine is the same as for res judicata, a defense applied by 
courts of equity that is rooted in both efficiency and fairness. Finally, even 
the statute of limitations enacted by Congress has an equitable corollary in 
the long-honored equitable doctrine of laches. 
1. Exhaustion.—The early habeas exhaustion cases framed the 
requirement that claims first be presented to the state court in terms of the 
availability of an alternative remedy.70 This rationale essentially tracks the 
traditional defense of withholding equitable relief if an applicant has an 
available remedy at law.71 The “available remedy at law” defense 
developed from the exceptional nature of equitable relief.72 Thus, if an 
equitable plaintiff had a remedy at law adequate to redress the injury, the 
equitable court would stay its hand and withhold the extraordinary 
equitable remedy on the theory that law goes first.73 This withholding of 
relief, moreover, applied whether or not the alternative remedy existed 
under state or federal law.74 And it operated with particular force when the 
applicant sought to restrain state action.75 
 
70 See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115 (1935) (per curiam) (holding that before the 
federal habeas remedy is available, state prisoner applicants must show that they invoked the state’s 
corrective judicial process but it was unavailable); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 235, 247 
(1895) (declining to grant habeas relief in advance of available state proceedings to test the validity of 
detention); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 194 (1892) (“As the defence in this case is . . . equally available 
in the State as in the Federal courts, we do not feel called upon at this time to consider it . . . .”).  
71 See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“It is a basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not 
act . . . when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law . . . .”). 
72 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 513–14 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting 
that equity courts generally withheld extraordinary equitable remedies unless common law courts 
“provided no adequate remedy for an injured person”), superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a) (1982); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932) (noting the longstanding equitable 
rule that prohibited “recourse to the extraordinary remedies of equity where the right asserted may be 
fully protected at law”).  
73 See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297 (1943). 
74 See, e.g., Matthews, 284 U.S. at 526 (“If the remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete, the 
aggrieved party is left to that remedy in the state courts . . . or to his suit at law in the federal 
courts . . . .”). 
75 This was particularly true in cases where the applicant sought to enjoin a state from collecting 
state taxes. See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 319 U.S. at 297 (“This Court has recognized that 
the federal courts, in the exercise of the sound discretion which has traditionally guided courts of equity 
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The habeas exhaustion requirement mirrors many of those equitable 
considerations. After all, the courts in forty-nine states provide relief on 
appeal to criminal defendants whose federal constitutional rights have been 
abridged.76 Requiring a habeas applicant to first seek available relief from 
state courts prevents federal courts from restraining state action where there 
is another available remedy.77 In addition, it reserves the extraordinary 
equitable remedy for those cases in which the applicant’s actions 
demonstrate that he has no state remedy.78 
2. Procedural Default.—In similar fashion, the procedural default 
doctrine bears a kinship to the traditional equitable defense of unclean 
hands. Although the origins and precise scope of the unclean hands 
doctrine have been disputed,79 one pithy summary proclaims: “He that hath 
committed iniquity shall not have equity.”80 Or, to put the same point no 
less poetically, the doctrine precludes a plaintiff from obtaining equitable 
relief where he “has soiled his hands by wronging . . . the opposite party.”81 
In sum, an applicant cannot obtain equitable relief if he has committed a 
legal wrong related to the dispute that has harmed the defendant.82 
 
in granting or withholding the extraordinary relief which they may afford, will not ordinarily restrain 
state officers from collecting state taxes where state law affords an adequate remedy to the taxpayer.”). 
76 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1219, 1222 n.8 (2013) 
(noting that forty-seven states provide an appellate remedy in all felony cases either by statute or under 
the Constitution and two other states provide a right to review through court rule). Virginia is the only 
state that does not provide a right to appeal. See id. 
77 The Court has defined “available remedy” for purposes of the exhaustion doctrine as a state 
remedy that is still available at the time the applicant files his federal petition. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982) (noting that the availability of the remedy for exhaustion purposes 
depends on its availability “at the time of the federal petition”); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 516 
(1972) (same); Larry W. Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for 
a Return to First Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 393 n.2 (1983) (“State remedies that were available 
at one time, but for some reason are no longer accessible . . . are relevant not to the question of 
exhaustion but to the related matter of effect to be given abortive state proceedings.”). 
78 Of course, as discussed supra Part I, just because the applicant has no available remedy in state 
court does not mean that he is entitled to have federal courts consider his habeas claim on the merits. In 
particular, if the applicant has no available remedy in state court because he has not complied with the 
state’s procedural rules, the procedural default doctrine would bar courts from considering his claim on 
the merits. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991) (“[T]he independent and adequate 
state ground doctrine . . . applies to bar federal habeas when a state court decline[s] to address a 
prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner . . . fail[s] to meet a state procedural requirement.”); 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86–87 (1977) (holding that the state procedural default doctrine 
barred federal habeas review absent a showing of cause and prejudice for the default). 
79 See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 
877, 878 (1949) (arguing that the defense neither has a vintage as long as previously thought nor is 
limited to equitable suits). 
80 See id. at 880 (quoting RICHARD FRANCIS, MAXIMS OF EQUITY 5 (London, Henry Lintot, 3d ed. 
1746)). 
81 Id. at 881. 
82 See id. 
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The shadow of unclean hands hangs over the procedural default 
doctrine. In this context, it is important to remember that the habeas 
applicant brings a federal action against the State alleging that his 
continued detention violates his federal constitutional rights.83 If the 
applicant has not complied with the process set forth by the state to review 
his claims, he has deprived the state court of the opportunity to consider 
them and to terminate his unlawful detention. Indeed, the Court has 
justified the procedural default rule on the ground that an applicant “who 
has failed to meet the State’s procedural requirements . . . has deprived the 
state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.”84 
To be sure, the procedural default doctrine does not precisely replicate 
the unclean hands defense. In particular, the failure to comply with state 
procedural rules is not completely equivalent to a legal or moral wrong 
committed against the State.85 Although an applicant’s noncompliance 
arguably injures the state by depriving it of an opportunity to correct its 
error, the State undoubtedly could waive enforcement of its procedural 
rules to reach the applicant’s claim. In that way, the wrong is perhaps better 
described as forcing the State to choose between its interest in enforcing its 
generally applicable procedural rules and its interest in having the state 
court reach the merits of the applicant’s claim. 
In addition, it is often the applicant’s lawyer, not the applicant, who 
fails to comply with the state’s procedural rules. The lawyer may well be 
acting as the applicant’s agent, and the lawyer’s conduct therefore is 
attributable to the applicant, but it is not clear that the unclean hands 
defense considers the conduct of anyone except the litigant himself.86 The 
procedural default doctrine therefore sweeps more broadly than unclean 
hands. Despite these differences, the two doctrines share sufficient 
characteristics to ground the procedural default doctrine in equitable 
principles. 
3. Abuse of the Writ.—The abuse of the writ doctrine also has roots 
in equitable principles. As the Court has noted, the rationale for this 
limitation parallels the justifications for res judicata,87 a doctrine with a 
long history that predates even the English common law split between 
 
83 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887–88 (1983) (characterizing the direct appeal as 
the “primary avenue for review of a conviction or sentence,” and the federal habeas remedy as a 
“secondary and limited” avenue). 
84 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). 
85 At most, such default signifies negligence by the applicant or, more usually, his attorney. 
86 See, e.g., Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 70 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 1934) 
(Hand, J., dissenting) (“The reasons which justify imputing liability to a principal for his agent’s 
acts . . . have nothing in common with [unclean hands, which] . . . stands upon the court’s repugnance to 
the suitor personally . . . .”), adopted as opinion of the court on rehearing, 107 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1939) 
(per curiam).  
87 See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (calling the abuse of the writ doctrine “a 
modified res judicata rule”). 
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courts of law and equity.88 English common law courts adopted both res 
judicata and collateral estoppel.89 And although res judicata may not have 
been recognized as an equitable defense in early English law (unlike 
adequacy of legal remedies, unclean hands, or laches),90 there is a long 
history in the United States of equity courts using the doctrine to block 
suits.91 This is no surprise. The essential justification for res judicata, after 
all, emanates from basic considerations of fairness. A litigant, so the 
argument goes, rightly deserves one bite at the apple, but not two. 
Otherwise, courts would facilitate opportunities for harassing defendants or 
subjecting them to unfairly inconsistent results, in contravention of the 
principles guiding practice in equitable courts.92 
4. Statute of Limitations.—Finally, the statute of limitations enacted 
in AEDPA mirrors laches, another traditional equitable defense. Under the 
laches doctrine, as initially conceived, a suit is barred if one has acted with 
unreasonable delay in bringing claims, thereby prejudicing the party 
against whom relief is sought.93 Over time, courts of equity refined the 
laches defense to make it resemble closely the defense found in statutes of 
limitations. Of particular importance, equity courts looked to the statutes of 
limitations that would govern similar suits at law and then applied those 
 
88 See Note, Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820 (1952) (noting 
that res judicata principles were “early adopted in English law”). 
89 See id. at 820–21. 
90 Equitable estoppel, which prevents a party from asserting contrary positions as to the same issue, 
was a traditional equitable defense, see T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel 
in Modern Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 377, 384–86 (2008), but it is not clear that res judicata was 
similarly established. 
91 See, e.g., Jacobson v. First Nat’l Bank of Bloomingdale, 31 A.2d 406, 408 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1943) 
(“[Res judicata] applies alike to decrees of courts of equity and judgments of courts of law, and the final 
determination in either court may be invoked as a bar or estoppel in the other.”); Brown v. Thompson, 
128 S.E. 309, 312 (W. Va. 1925) (“Either party . . . is estopped from alleging in a suit at common law 
or in chancery anything inconsistent with any point, which has been before adjudicated by a court of 
either common law or chancery . . . .” (quoting Poole v. Dilworth, 26 W. Va. 583 (1885))); Hayes v. 
Frohock, 47 So. 343, 343 (Fla. 1908) (holding that a determination made in a court of law is binding in 
a subsequent equity proceeding). 
92 Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1208 (Ill. 1996) (reasoning that the policy 
behind res judicata “is to protect the defendant from harassment and the public from multiple 
litigation”); Lewis A. Grossman, The Story of Parklane: The “Litigation Crisis” and the Efficiency 
Imperative, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 405, 408 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2008) (noting that courts 
and scholars traditionally defend res judicata because it “protects litigants from harassment through the 
litigation of the same claim or issue” (quoting Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: 
The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1723 (1968))).  
93 See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 217 (2005) (“[L]aches, a 
doctrine [that] focuse[s] on one side’s inaction and the other’s legitimate reliance, may bar . . . claims 
for equitable relief.”); Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the 
Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 257 n.43 (2003) (“The doctrine of 
laches . . . bar[s] equitable relief in cases where a claimant’s delay has resulted in prejudice to the 
defendant.”). 
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limitations even without a showing of prejudice.94 In addition, state 
legislatures began to pass statutes of limitations for equity suits, and courts 
did not hesitate to apply them.95 AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations,96 
although short,97 mirrors the equitable considerations that underlie the 
laches doctrine. Thus, all four of these gatekeeping doctrines have 
connections with traditional equitable principles. 
B. Focus on the Applicant’s Conduct 
Each of these four bars turns on the applicant’s conduct, a factor that 
traditionally has been an equitable consideration.98 The focus on the 
applicant’s conduct is especially apparent in the abuse of the writ and 
exhaustion doctrines, but it also animates the procedural default and statute 
of limitations defenses. Indeed, as discussed below, each of these four bars 
contains exceptions for applicants who were unable to comply with the 
requirements for reasons beyond their control.99 
The abuse of the writ doctrine especially focuses on the applicant’s 
conduct. Upon filing a first federal habeas petition, the applicant has notice 
that, absent extraordinary circumstances relating to the unavailability of the 
claim at the time, all claims must be asserted together.100 To be sure, the 
“abuse” this doctrine targets often has less to do with the applicant’s 
conduct than his lawyer’s. Much of the criticism of this doctrine therefore 
stems from concerns about holding clients responsible for their lawyers’ 
errors. Even so, the acts of an agent are normally attributed to the 
 
94 See, e.g., Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 289 (1940) (“[E]quity will withhold its remedy if the 
legal right is barred by the local statute of limitations.”); Michael E. Baughman, Comment, Defining the 
Boundaries of the Adverse Domination Doctrine: Is There Any Repose for Corporate Directors?, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1072 (1995) (“By the end of the nineteenth century, equity courts generally 
adopted the limitation periods found in analogous statutes of limitations at law.”). 
95 See, e.g., Poag v. Flories, 317 S.W.3d 820, 825–26 (Tex. App. 2010) (applying statute of 
limitations for equity suits to quiet title action); Bird v. Chandler, 144 S.E. 265, 265–66 (Ga. 1928) 
(barring suit for accounting based on the statute of limitations for equity suits). 
96 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006). 
97 Compare id. (setting forth a one-year statute of limitations), with id. § 1658(a) (providing a four-
year statute of limitations as a default rule in civil actions arising under Acts of Congress). 
98 See, e.g., Brown v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 134 U.S. 530, 535 (1890) (“[T]he maxim, ‘He who 
seeks equity must do equity,’ is as appropriate to the conduct of the defendant as to that of the 
complainant.”); In re Prudhomme, 43 F.3d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir. 1995) (tolling a statute of limitations in 
bankruptcy due to the inequitable conduct of the parties); Brendan D. Cummins, The Thorny Path to 
Thornhill: The Origins at Equity of the Free Speech Overbreadth Doctrine, 105 YALE L.J. 1671, 1678 
(1996) (noting that courts of equity modify injunctions if they are so expansive as to encompass the 
“conduct of innocent parties”). 
99 See infra Part II.C. 
100 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991) (noting that applicants are on notice at the 
time of the initial filing and can abuse the writ “regardless of whether the failure to raise [the claim] 
earlier stemmed from a deliberate choice”).  
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principal,101 and so this bar reflects consideration of a factor emphasized by 
courts of equity for generations. 
The exhaustion requirement also focuses on the applicant’s own 
conduct—namely, whether he fairly presented the issue to the state court so 
that it could correct the claimed legal error. And, unlike the other four 
gatekeepers, the exhaustion bar permits applicants with unexhausted claims 
to cure that shortcoming even after filing the federal petition.102 Particularly 
for this reason, courts can and do attribute any failure to exhaust other 
available remedies to the informed choice of the applicant himself. 
The procedural default doctrine likewise responds to the applicant’s 
conduct—or at least the conduct of his lawyer. Importantly, this defense is 
not available unless the state procedural rule was “firmly established and 
regularly followed.”103 Thus, the applicant (or at least his counsel) must be 
put on fair notice of the need to comply with such rules at the critical point 
of decision before the applicant suffers forfeiture of his habeas claim.104 
This doctrine, like the abuse of the writ defense, has been criticized both on 
the ground that applicants should not be prejudiced by their attorneys’ 
mistakes105 and because in some cases, the rules are hard to discover for 
even the best lawyers. But these arguments take issue with general 
principles of agency law rather than with the procedural default doctrine 
itself. 
Finally, the statute of limitations focuses on the applicant’s own 
conduct in the most direct way: it imposes a bar based on the applicant’s 
 
101 Note, The Power of an Agent to Bind His Principal by Acts Beyond His Actual or Apparent 
Authority, 42 HARV. L. REV. 685, 685 (1929) (noting how courts recognize agents’ acts as binding the 
principal even beyond instances of real or apparent authority). 
102 See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487 (2000) (noting that dismissal for failure to exhaust 
leaves applicants with the option of subsequently exhausting state remedies and returning to federal 
court without running afoul of the abuse of the writ doctrine); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982) 
(finding that a total exhaustion rule would not prevent applicants from obtaining speedy federal relief 
because they retain the option of amending their petitions to eliminate unexhausted claims or returning 
to state court to exhaust state remedies before returning to federal court). 
103 Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002) (quoting James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348 
(1984)); see also Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424–25 (1991) (holding state rule not “firmly 
established” when retroactively applied); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348–49 (1984) (finding 
state rule distinguishing between jury instructions and admonitions to be arid formalism, not firmly 
established and generally followed).  
104 Of course, it can be very difficult to comply with at least some of those rules, such as the 
contemporaneous objection rule requiring defendants to object during the course of the trial to preserve 
an issue on appeal. See Stephen B. Bright, Preserving Error at Capital Trials, CHAMPION, April 1997, 
available at http://www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/97apr03.htm (noting that “[p]reserving all 
grounds can be very difficult in the heat of battle during trial”).  
105 See, e.g., Rae K. Inafuku, Comment, Coleman v. Thompson—Sacrificing Fundamental Rights 
in Deference to the States: The Supreme Court’s 1991 Interpretation of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 625, 651 (1994) (asserting that the problem with Coleman was that it forced 
clients to lose state and federal habeas appeals because of their attorneys’ mistakes, even if they could 
have raised an ineffective assistance challenge on direct review).  
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lack of diligence in presenting claims in federal court. To be sure, 
AEDPA’s limitations period is notably short.106 But the bar nonetheless 
relates to a factor within the control of the applicant and his attorney.107 
Thus, each of these habeas bars closely correlates to the applicant’s 
voluntary conduct. 
C. Equitable Exceptions 
In addition to their focus on the individual applicant’s conduct, the 
existence of individualized exceptions to each of these bars demonstrates 
their equitable heritage in an especially powerful way. In particular, these 
exceptions reflect instances in which the applicant’s conduct in a given 
case could be deemed blameless, or the applicant has a distinctively 
significant need for redress, or both. To be sure, AEDPA’s codifications of 
these gatekeeping bars—particularly abuse of the writ and the statute of 
limitations—has limited the availability of the equitable exceptions. Even 
with AEDPA’s restrictions of the remedy, however, equitable exceptions to 
the bars still exist. 
1. Procedural Default and Abuse of the Writ Exceptions.—As 
formulated by the Supreme Court, both the procedural default and abuse of 
the writ doctrines provide an exception if the applicant can establish a 
justifiable “cause” for the default and “actual prejudice as a result of the 
alleged violation of federal law.”108 Given the focus on the applicant’s 
conduct, the equitable origins of this exception can be easily discerned. 
Indeed, the Court has explained that allowing claims that meet the cause 
and prejudice exception to go forward “reflect[s] an equitable judgment 
that only where a prisoner is impeded or obstructed in complying with the 
State’s established procedures will a federal habeas court excuse the 
 
106 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006) (announcing a one-year filing period). 
107 Most complaints about this bar stem from attorney error in calculating the time periods. See, 
e.g., Marni von Wilpert, Comment, Holland v. Florida: A Prisoner’s Last Chance, Attorney Error, and 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s One-Year Statute of Limitations Period for Federal 
Habeas Corpus Review, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429, 1433 (2010) (noting the “alarming trend” of 
attorneys failing to file their clients’ petitions on time). But see Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–
37 (2007) (“Attorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in 
the postconviction context where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel.”). Holding the 
applicant responsible for the attorney’s errors, of course, raises significant issues that perhaps are better 
addressed on different grounds. See, e.g., Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 924 (2012) (holding that 
“a client cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has abandoned him”). 
108 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 
494 (1991) (holding that the cause and prejudice standard developed in the procedural default context 
also applies to the abuse of the writ doctrine). As discussed below, in 1996, Congress amended the 
statute to narrow the cause and prejudice exception that applies to the abuse of the writ doctrine. See 
infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. There is one additional narrow exception if the applicant 
can establish that a failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 
See infra notes 117–18. 
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prisoner from the usual sanction of default.”109 In other words, where the 
failure to properly raise a claim (either in accordance with state rules or in 
an initial federal petition) cannot fairly be attributed to the applicant’s 
conduct, these bars—grounded in equity—should not preclude 
consideration of a potent or meritorious constitutional claim. 
The Court in Martinez v. Ryan discussed at length the equitable nature 
of the cause and prejudice exception in the context of the procedural 
default bar.110 State law expressly required the applicant to raise any claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral proceeding, rather than 
on direct review.111 Martinez’s appellate counsel filed his appeal, and while 
the appeal was pending, she also filed a state habeas petition on Martinez’s 
behalf. The attorney’s brief in support of collateral relief did not raise any 
claim based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the state habeas 
court dismissed the petition.112 When Martinez thereafter tried to argue 
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in a second state habeas petition, 
the state court refused to reach the merits of the claim because he had not 
raised it in his first petition. On federal habeas review, the State argued 
procedural default, since the state court invoked its successive petition rule 
to bar consideration of his claim. Martinez then argued that his state habeas 
counsel’s ineffectiveness constituted cause for that procedural default.113 
The Court declined to decide whether applicants have a constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel in initial-review collateral 
proceedings (i.e., proceedings in which an applicant raises claims that 
could not be brought on direct review). Instead, it propounded an 
“equitable ruling” that an applicant can establish “cause” to excuse 
procedural default when he can show either ineffective assistance by an 
attorney appointed in initial-review collateral proceedings or that no 
counsel was appointed in such proceedings.114 The Court went to great 
lengths to emphasize that this rule stemmed from its equitable power to 
hear substantial claims that were procedurally defaulted through no fault of 
the applicant.115 And more recently, the Court has broadened Martinez’s 
equitable exception to encompass not only instances in which state law 
expressly requires the defendant to raise ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims on direct review, but also situations in which a defendant may 
 
109 Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012). 
110 Id. at 1318–19.  
111 Id. at 1313. The Court called these “initial-review collateral proceedings.” Id. at 1315.  
112 Id. at 1314. In fact, counsel contended that Martinez did not have any meritorious issues. Id. 
113 Id. at 1314–15. 
114 Id. at 1318–19. 
115 See id. at 1318 (“Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the absence of an attorney) caused a procedural default in an 
initial-review collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that the initial-review 
collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or with ineffective counsel, may not have been 
sufficient to ensure that proper consideration was given to a substantial claim.”). 
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present the claim on direct review, but the state’s procedures make it 
“virtually impossible” for appellate counsel to do so.116 
Both the abuse of the writ and procedural default doctrines also are 
subject to an additional narrow exception permitting habeas relief where an 
applicant cannot establish cause and prejudice but can demonstrate either a 
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” or “actual innocence.”117 This 
standard imposes an extremely high burden on the applicant, and very 
few—or no—applicants have been successful in invoking it.118 But even if 
it provides only the slimmest possibility for relief, the Court still has 
fashioned a mechanism for courts to grant relief to otherwise barred claims 
based on an individualized consideration of the applicant’s claim.119 For 
procedural default, then, the cause and prejudice exception (along with the 
individualized consideration of the actual innocence exception, even if the 
possibility of relief is very slim) provides a meaningful opportunity for 
applicants to avoid the bar on relief. 
In contrast to the cause and prejudice exception to the procedural 
default bar, the abuse of the writ doctrine’s cause and prejudice exception 
presents a more problematic story. This is so both because the Court 
accompanied its recognition of the exception with an expansion of the 
abuse of the writ bar and because Congress has significantly raised the 
standard for showing cause and prejudice to excuse abuse of the writ. In 
McCleskey v. Zant, the Court held that a showing of cause and prejudice 
could excuse an abuse of the writ.120 Before reaching that conclusion, 
however, the Court first expanded the scope of the abuse of the writ bar by 
holding it applicable not just to those who “deliberate[ly] abandon[ed]” 
their claims in the first petition, but also to any applicant who failed to raise 
a claim in the first petition even if that failure resulted from neglect rather 
than deliberate choice.121 As a result, although the Court recognized the 
 
116 See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (quoting Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 
810–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). 
117 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339–40 (1992) (“We have previously held that even 
if a state prisoner cannot meet the cause and prejudice standard, a federal court may hear the merits of 
the successive claims if the failure to hear the claims would constitute a ‘miscarriage of justice’ . . . or 
‘actual innocence’ . . . .”).  
118 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995) (“[H]abeas corpus petitions that advance a 
substantial claim of actual innocence are extremely rare.”); Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 161 (2d Cir. 
2004) (noting that “credible claims of actual innocence are ‘extremely rare’” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. 
at 321–22)); see also Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness v. “Process,” 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 317 n.21 (1999) (observing that the author could find no cases that had 
successfully argued this exception). The author has been unable to identify any cases in which an 
applicant successfully invoked the actual innocence exception in the fourteen years since Judge 
Reinhardt conducted that same search.  
119 See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1–2 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that a claim of actual 
innocence, particularly in a capital case, may alter the application of certain AEDPA requirements). 
120 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991).  
121 See id. at 489.  
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cause and prejudice exception to excuse certain instances of excusable 
neglect by the applicant, that recognition was overshadowed by its 
conclusion that the abuse of the writ doctrine applied to negligent (in 
addition to deliberate) failures to raise claims in initial petitions.122 
Of more importance, when Congress codified the abuse of the writ bar 
in AEDPA, it replaced the common law cause and prejudice standard with 
a much more limited exception.123 Under AEDPA, an abuse of the writ can 
be excused if: 
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered 
previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying 
the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be 
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant 
guilty of the underlying offense.124 
The statute’s requirement that the applicant establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him 
guilty absent the constitutional error significantly raises the cause and 
prejudice standard for abuse of the writ, which previously had required 
only a showing that there was a “substantial likelihood” that the error 
prejudiced his chances of a different verdict.125 That fact notwithstanding, 
the exception still provides individualized consideration of both the 
applicant’s fault in failing to raise the claim in the first petition and the 
merits of his claim.126 
 
122 See Reinhardt, supra note 118, at 317 & n.20 (noting the Rehnquist Court’s expansion of the 
abuse of the writ doctrine and general “assault” on the habeas writ through cases like McCleskey). To 
phrase it slightly differently, had the Court in McCleskey held that the abuse of the writ doctrine applied 
only to instances in which the petitioner made a deliberate choice not to raise the claim in his original 
federal habeas petition, the cause and prejudice exception would not have been needed.  
123 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2006), amended by AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104–32, § 106, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996); see also In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[R]ather than 
showing that a second or successive motion is not an abuse of the writ, a movant must satisfy the more 
stringent [AEDPA] gatekeeping standards.”); In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting 
that the “more rigorous” AEDPA standard replaced the common law cause and prejudice test).  
124 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), amended by AEDPA § 106. The Act also has an exception if 
the claim relies on a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A).  
125 See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 174 (1982); Williams v. United States, 98 F.3d 1052, 
1054 (8th Cir. 1996). 
126 The statute also provides an exception for claims that “rely[] on a new rule of constitutional 
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), amended by AEDPA § 106. This second exception, like the 
first, stems from the fact that the applicant cannot be faulted for failing to raise a claim based on a new 
rule of constitutional law in the earlier petition. As discussed infra Part III.A, the Court in Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), narrowed the instances in which new rules will apply retroactively. Subject 
to narrow exceptions, the Court held that new procedural constitutional rules will not apply 
retroactively to habeas cases that were final at the time the Court decided the new rule, but new 
substantive constitutional rules will.  
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2. Exceptions to the Exhaustion Requirement.—The exhaustion 
requirement is also subject to exceptions derived from equity. In particular, 
the Supreme Court has held that so long as a state court has resolved an 
issue on direct review, the applicant has exhausted the claim and does not 
have to pursue state collateral review of that issue prior to filing a federal 
habeas petition on that matter.127 This rule parallels the maxim that equity 
does not require an idle or meaningless gesture.128 In other words, once the 
state appellate courts have had the opportunity to consider the issue, it 
makes little sense to “mandate recourse to state collateral review whose 
results have effectively been predetermined.”129 
In addition, because the exhaustion requirement focuses on the 
applicant’s conduct, it requires only that he has fairly and properly 
presented the issue to a state court.130 Even if a state court fails to rule on a 
properly presented claim, the applicant will have adequately exhausted his 
remedies as long as he has attempted to obtain a state resolution of the 
issue.131 The exhaustion requirement, moreover, does not apply unless a 
state remedy actually exists at the time the applicant files his habeas 
petition; otherwise, there is no process to exhaust.132 Finally, because 
federal courts permit applicants to cure any failures to exhaust, diligent 
applicants can cure any exhaustion bar. 
3. Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations.—Equitable 
considerations also drive the three exceptions to AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations, each of which comes into play when the applicant’s failure to 
timely file was beyond his control. First, if delay resulted from an 
“impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of 
the Constitution or laws of the United States,” the statute of limitations 
period begins only when the state removes the impediment.133 Second, as 
 
127 See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350 (1989) (“[O]nce the state courts have ruled 
upon a claim, it is not necessary for a petitioner ‘to ask the state for collateral relief, based upon the 
same evidence and issues already decided by direct review.’” (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 
447 (1953))). This exception existed both before and after Congress’s codification of the exhaustion 
requirement.  
128 See, e.g., Roger S. Braugh, Jr. & Paul C. Sewell, Equitable Bill of Review: Unraveling the 
Cause of Action that Confounds Texas Courts, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 631 (1996) (“[E]quity will not 
do a vain thing.”).  
129 Castille, 489 U.S. at 350. 
130 See Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332, 333 (1978) (per curiam) (noting that whether the 
exhaustion requirement is met depends on the applicant’s conduct, not what the state court chooses to 
do with the claims presented).  
131 See id. at 333–34. Of course, as discussed supra Part I, the applicant must have complied with 
the state’s procedural rules in presenting the claim. 
132 See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982); Yackle, supra note 77. 
133 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) (2006); see, e.g., Critchley v. Thaler, 586 F.3d 318, 318 (5th Cir. 
2009) (holding that the state court’s failure to file a prisoner’s state habeas petition constituted a state-
created impediment under AEDPA).  
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with the abuse of the writ doctrine, if the Supreme Court announces a new 
constitutional rule made retroactively applicable to habeas cases, the 
limitations period starts when the Supreme Court announces that ruling.134 
Finally, if the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 
“discovered through the exercise of due diligence,” the statute of 
limitations begins when the factual predicate could have been discovered.135 
In keeping with the focus on the party’s conduct that guided equitable 
courts, each of these exceptions hinges on a circumstance that makes 
compliance with the statute effectively impossible, so that noncompliance 
is not fairly attributable to the applicant’s choice. 
In addition, the Court has held that the limitations period may be 
equitably tolled where the applicant has been “pursuing his rights 
diligently” and “some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and 
prevented timely filing.”136 This may present a high bar,137 but its equitable 
nature could not be more apparent. Tolling turns on both the applicant’s 
conduct and the reasons for the delay, factors central to equitable 
consideration. 
Finally, the Court recently held that the “actual-innocence” or 
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” gateway applies to the statute of 
limitations bar as well as to the abuse of the writ and procedural default 
bars.138 The Court emphasized that “tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas 
are rare,”139 and as discussed above, it appears that few, if any, courts have 
found that a petitioner has made a sufficiently compelling claim of actual 
innocence to warrant relief,140 but the gateway at least provides an avenue 
of relief for the most compelling claims. 
All of these exceptions have been criticized on the ground that they are 
too narrow.141 And an equitable balancing may well counsel in favor of 
broader exceptions. But at the very least, these individualized exceptions, 
 
134 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 
135 Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 
136 Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560–62 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(holding that equitable tolling applies to one-year filing period in part because of “the fact that equitable 
principles have traditionally governed the substantive law of habeas corpus”).  
137 See, e.g., Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 2011) (“As a general matter, we set a 
high bar to deem circumstances sufficiently ‘extraordinary’ to warrant equitable tolling.”). 
138 See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013).  
139 Id. Notably, the Court concluded that Perkins’s showing of actual innocence was not 
sufficiently compelling to entitle him to use the gateway around the statute of limitations bar. Id. at 
1936. 
140 See supra Part II.C.1. 
141 See, e.g., John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 289 
(2006) (criticizing AEDPA’s statute of limitations for depriving without sufficient reason “thousands of 
potential habeas petitioners of any federal review of their convictions, and in some cases, their death 
sentences”); John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 475 (2011) (highlighting how the complexity and unyielding nature of 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) encourages not only early filings, but also dismissal of otherwise meritorious claims). 
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like the bars themselves, demonstrate the equitable considerations 
underlying the habeas remedy. 
III. TEAGUE’S EQUITABLE OUTLIER STATUS 
Unlike the four gatekeeping requirements discussed above, the 
nonretroactivity rule from Teague does not reflect principles of equity. It 
has no analogue in traditional equitable doctrine, it applies without regard 
to either the applicant’s conduct or the strength of his claim, and it has no 
exceptions that take account of the individual applicant’s lack of fault. 
Understanding the origins and basic operation of the Teague rule helps to 
demonstrate its status as an inequitable outlier in the law of habeas corpus. 
A. Teague’s History and Operation 
Teague announced a sweeping new rule. Until 1965, federal courts 
routinely applied the Supreme Court’s new rules of criminal procedure to 
all cases that came before them, whether on direct review or in habeas 
proceedings.142 Indeed, the Court sometimes declared new constitutional 
rules in habeas cases.143 In Linkletter v. Walker, however, the Court 
concluded that the Constitution did not require it to apply its decisions 
retroactively and set forth a new rule for assessing retroactivity.144 Under 
the Linkletter rule, the Court was to “weigh the merits and demerits in each 
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and 
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its 
operation.”145 
Applying those principles to its holding in Mapp v. Ohio,146 the 
Linkletter Court concluded that Mapp’s new spin on the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule147 should not apply retroactively to cases 
“finally decided”—i.e., cases that had run the course of direct appeal and 
petition for certiorari—prior to Mapp.148 Linkletter led to complaints that it 
was inconsistently applied.149 In several opinions, Justice Harlan urged the 
 
142 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965) (noting that the Court previously had 
“applied new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule”). 
143 See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (holding in a habeas proceeding that bail “must 
be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant” (emphasis 
added)). 
144 381 U.S. at 629. 
145 Id. 
146 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
147 Id. at 654–55 (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to state prosecutions).  
148 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 n.5. 
149 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 54–57 
(1978); Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 
1557 (1975); Jonathan Mallamud, Prospective Limitation and the Rights of the Accused, 56 IOWA L. 
REV. 321 (1970); Ralph A. Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court and the Problem 
of Retroactivity, 23 EMORY L.J. 381 (1974).  
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Court to adopt a standard that would make new constitutional rules 
applicable to all cases that were not final on direct review at the time of the 
Court’s new rule, but inapplicable to cases that were final on direct review 
at that time.150 He argued that this standard would bring greater clarity and 
consistency to the Court’s treatment of retroactivity issues. 
Twenty years after Linkletter, Justice Harlan’s argument bore fruit 
when the Court announced the Teague gatekeeping limitation, under which 
most new rules would not apply retroactively to finally decided cases.151 
The Court in Teague discussed at length Justice Harlan’s earlier 
observations in concluding that collateral habeas review and direct 
appellate review serve different purposes.152 While direct review seeks to 
protect the defendant’s individual rights, “the threat of habeas serves as a 
necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the 
land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established 
constitutional standards.”153 Thus, the Court concluded, because the 
“interests of comity and finality must . . . be considered in determining the 
proper scope of habeas review” and because applying new rules to final 
convictions imposes costs on states that “generally far outweigh the 
benefits of this application,” Justice Harlan’s direct-review-centered 
approach to retroactivity struck the proper legal balance.154 
Under the Teague gatekeeping limitation, if a Supreme Court decision 
announces a “new rule” of criminal procedure, that rule may not be 
invoked in pending federal habeas proceedings reviewing state 
imprisonment155 unless it falls within one of two “exceptions,” the first of 
which is more properly characterized as a definition of the scope of the 
Teague rule rather than an “exception” and the second of which appears to 
exist only in theory.156 First, the Court limited the retroactivity ban to new 
“procedural” rules that “regulate only the manner of determining the 
 
150 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675, 677–81 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256, 258 (1969) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
151 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309–10 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). The “new rule” 
portion of Justice O’Connor’s Teague opinion drew only a plurality of the Court, but a majority of the 
Court reaffirmed Teague later that term in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 303 (1989).  
152 Teague, 489 U.S. at 305–07 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
153 Id. at 306 (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 262–63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  
154 Id. at 308, 310 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in 
the judgment)). 
155 The Court in Teague did not address whether its nonretroactivity rule applied to federal 
prisoners seeking habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Teague, 489 U.S. at 327 n.1 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). The Court since has declined to address the issue, see, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 
U.S. 264, 269 n.4 (2007), including most recently in Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 
n.16 (2013), in which the Court held that the issue of Teague’s applicability to federal prisoners had not 
been properly preserved for decision.  
156 See infra notes 161–64 and accompanying text.  
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defendant’s culpability.”157 If a new rule is substantive, i.e., it makes certain 
conduct noncriminal or prohibits certain penalties for a particular class of 
offenders, then Teague does not apply, and the new rule applies equally to 
cases on direct and collateral habeas review.158 In recent years, the Court 
has decided several substantive (rather than procedural) Eighth 
Amendment cases, concluding that certain categories of offenders cannot 
be subject to the death penalty or life-without-parole sentences.159 Most of 
the Court’s new rulings in criminal cases are procedural, though, and 
habeas applicants therefore cannot invoke them retroactively.160 
The Teague rule has one other exception: a new procedural rule may 
apply retroactively if it constitutes a “watershed rule[] . . . implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding,”161 or, to put 
it another way, a “bedrock procedural rule[] without which the likelihood 
of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”162 The most important 
feature of this “exception” is that it apparently exists only in theory. The 
Court has expressed great skepticism about whether any new constitutional 
rule could meet this exacting standard.163 Indeed, it never has found any 
new procedural rule that falls within the reach of this so-called exception.164 
 
157 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–53 (2004) (emphasis omitted). As the Court has 
noted, although it has sometimes “referred to [substantive] rules . . . as falling under an exception to 
Teague’s bar on retroactive application of procedural rules, they are more accurately characterized as 
substantive rules not subject to the bar.” Id. at 352 n.4 (citation omitted).  
158 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); see also Bousley v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1998) (holding that Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), applies 
retroactively to cases on collateral review because it announced a substantive rule); Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302, 329–30 (1989) (holding that Teague’s retroactivity limitations would not apply if, for 
instance, the Court prohibited the death penalty for certain types of offenders, such as developmentally 
disabled defendants). The Court’s recent cases finding unconstitutional the execution of those who were 
juveniles when they committed the offense, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and of the 
mentally retarded, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), as well as its decision finding 
unconstitutional juvenile life-without-parole sentences for non-murder offenses, Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010), all fall in the substantive rules category. In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(holding Graham applies retroactively); Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2002) (same, for 
Atkins); Arroyo v. Dretke, 362 F. Supp. 2d 859, 883 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (same, for Roper). 
159 See supra note 158. 
160 See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 406–07 (2007) (holding that the Confrontation Clause 
rule announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), was procedural); Schriro, 542 U.S. at 
353 (holding that the Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002), requiring that 
juries, rather than judges, make threshold findings for death penalty eligibility, announced a procedural 
rule). 
161 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
162 Id. at 505 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
163 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“[W]e believe it unlikely that 
many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge.”). 
164 See, e.g., Whorton, 549 U.S. at 406 (holding that Crawford announced a new procedural rule 
but not a watershed one); Schriro, 542 U.S. at 348 (holding that Ring announced a procedural rule but 
not a watershed one). Indeed, the Court has suggested that the right to counsel guaranteed by Gideon v. 
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B. The Effects of Teague 
Teague has sparked much criticism both because of the breadth of the 
Supreme Court’s rule and because of its perceived unfairness.165 As to the 
former critique, the Court, in applying Teague, has defined “new” rules 
broadly to encompass any rule that either was “susceptible to debate among 
reasonable minds” at the time the applicant’s conviction became final166 or 
was not “apparent to all reasonable jurists.”167 Stated somewhat differently, 
federal habeas courts must “determine whether a state court considering 
[the defendant’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have 
felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks 
was required by the Constitution.”168 If not, then the rule is new. The 
breadth of this definition cannot be overstated. After all, unanimity among 
reasonable jurists on any constitutional issue before the Supreme Court is 
rare.169 
Even if an applicant relies on cases already decided at the time his 
conviction became final, moreover, the habeas court still must ascertain 
whether the applicant’s claim seeks to have the prior decision “applied in a 
novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.”170 If so, Teague bars relief. 
For instance, a habeas applicant relying on the Court’s well-established 
precedent setting forth the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims171 cannot seek to apply that standard to any situation the Court has 
not yet decided.172 Indeed, it appears that Teague bars consideration even of 
 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), may be the one rule that would fall within this exception. Teague, 
489 U.S. at 311–12 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 
694 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  
165 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 100 & n.310 
(2004); Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 823–27 (1992); Meyer, supra note 
59, at 438–47; Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2385–99 (1993).  
166 Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1990); Christopher S. Strauss, Comment, Collateral 
Damage: How the Supreme Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners’ Apprendi 
Claims on Collateral Review, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1222 (2003). 
167 Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527–28 (1997) (emphasis added). 
168 Id. at 527 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
169 In the Court’s 2011–2012 term, approximately 27% of the Court’s merits opinions (including 
summary reversals) were unanimous in their entirety, and 44% of the Court’s merits opinions were 
unanimous (meaning that there was at least one concurrence). See Memorandum from 
SCOTUSblog.com 2 (June 30, 2012), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/06/SCOTUSblog_Summary_Memo_OT11.pdf. Assuming the reasonableness of all Supreme 
Court Justices, that means that 56%–73% of Supreme Court opinions are “new rules.” Assuming that 
the views of Supreme Court Justices do not represent the outer bounds of the views of “reasonable 
jurists,” moreover, the percentage of cases deciding “new rules” rises significantly. See Chaidez v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1108–11 (2013) (noting that prior to the Court’s decision in Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), a number of lower federal courts and state courts had reached a 
different conclusion from Padilla, and therefore concluding that Padilla announced a new rule).  
170 Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992). 
171 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
172 See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110–11.  
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new claims that can only be considered on habeas, such as a claim that a 
habeas applicant has a right to effective assistance of counsel on post-
conviction review.173 Thus, Teague bars relief on any claim that relies on 
any extension of even well-established rules. 
The second chief complaint about the Teague rule is that it unfairly 
compels different results for similarly situated applicants based only on the 
happenstance of when their cases become final, while turning a blind eye to 
the consequences of leaving the constitutional error unremedied in one case 
and not another.174 Notably, empirical evidence demonstrates that Teague 
bars claims in capital cases at a significantly higher rate than in noncapital 
cases.175 
An example illustrates the point. In 1983, George Banks was 
convicted on twelve counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 
Pennsylvania after he killed thirteen people.176 Most of his victims were 
members of his immediate or extended family, and five of them were his 
children.177 Both at trial and during the sentencing phase, experts disputed 
the extent and impact of Banks’s mental illness.178 Defense experts 
concluded that Banks had long suffered from a severe mental defect 
(paranoid psychosis with paranoid delusions) and that because of this 
illness, he was incapable of understanding the nature and quality of his 
criminal acts, or distinguishing right from wrong.179 According to these 
witnesses, Banks, a former prison guard, was taunted as a child because he 
had one black and one white parent. He “developed a persecution complex 
and became obsessed with the paranoid delusion that there were soon to be 
international race wars and uprisings.”180 He armed himself for the coming 
race wars and spoke of killing himself and his “children rather than see 
them brought up as he had been in a racist society.”181 The State’s experts 
 
173 See infra Part IV.A.3. 
174 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 341 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[A] person may be killed although he or she has a constitutional claim that would 
have barred his or her execution had this Court only announced the constitutional rule before his or her 
conviction and sentence became final. It is intolerable that the difference between life and death should 
turn on such a fortuity of timing . . . .”); Habeas Corpus Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 4737, H.R 1090, 
H.R. 1953, and H.R. 3584 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Admin. of Justice of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 160 (1990) (statement of C.J. Gilbert S. Merritt) 
(“[Teague] has the effect essentially of freezing the Bill of Rights in habeas cases in its present form, 
and not allowing . . . the [f]ederal courts to review any suggested modification . . . .”).  
175 See KING ET AL., supra note 17, at 45, 49 (setting forth data demonstrating that 24% of capital 
cases had at least one Teague-barred claim, while less than 1% of the noncapital claims had a Teague-
barred claim).  
176 Commonwealth v. Banks, 521 A.2d 1, 3, 5–6 (Pa. 1987).  
177 Id. at 5–6. 
178 Id. at 6–7. In addition, the court held two competency hearings prior to the trial. Id. at 10. 
179 See id. 
180 Id. at 7. 
181 Id. 
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did not dispute the defense experts’ diagnosis, but they disagreed with the 
claim that the delusions made Banks unable to distinguish right from 
wrong. 
Less than one year after Banks’s conviction became final, in Mills v. 
Maryland, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a capital sentencing 
scheme that required jurors to disregard any mitigating factors upon which 
they did not unanimously agree.182 Two years later, in Boyde v. California, 
the Court clarified that the Mills rule encompassed sentencing schemes in 
which there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted 
instructions in an unconstitutional manner, i.e., as requiring juror unanimity 
on mitigating factors.183 Banks, both in state post-conviction collateral 
proceedings184 and later in federal habeas proceedings, argued that a 
reasonable jury could have interpreted the instructions given in his case to 
unconstitutionally require juror unanimity as to mitigating circumstances, 
including the existence of his mental disorders.185 Given the mitigating 
evidence Banks presented and the extent to which that evidence was 
disputed by the parties’ expert witnesses, any such juror misunderstanding 
could have affected the sentence, and in fact the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that Banks’s sentencing was 
unconstitutional under Mills.186 It thus granted habeas relief.187 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mills articulated a new 
procedural rule that under Teague did not apply to cases—like Banks’s—
that were final when the Court issued Mills.188 The Court recognized that 
the Mills rule was intended to enhance the accuracy of sentencing 
proceedings and to guard against the risk that “[e]leven of twelve jurors, 
could, for example, agree that six mitigating circumstances existed, but one 
holdout juror could nevertheless force the death sentence.”189 Nonetheless, 
the Court concluded that because Mills “applies fairly narrowly and works 
no fundamental shift in our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements essential to fundamental fairness,” it did not fall within Teague’s 
watershed-rule exception.190 As a result, based only on the date his 
conviction became final, Banks could not obtain redress for any Mills error, 
regardless of how grave it was.191 Indeed, if his conviction had become 
 
182 486 U.S. 367, 371, 384 (1988). 
183 494 U.S. 370, 380–81 (1990). 
184 Commonwealth v. Banks, 656 A.2d 467, 470–72 (Pa. 1995) (addressing Banks’s Mills claim on 
the merits on post-conviction review). 
185 See, e.g., Banks v. Horn, 271 F.3d 527, 535 (3d Cir. 2001).  
186 Id. 544–51. 
187 Id. at 551. 
188 See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416, 420 (2004). 
189 Id. at 419. 
190 Id. at 417, 420 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
191 Banks’s mother subsequently filed a petition in state court asserting that he was incompetent to 
be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and seeking a stay of execution. 
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final only nine months later (or if Mills had been issued nine months 
earlier), he could have obtained habeas relief.192 
Banks, of course, could be an extraordinary case. Since 1989, 
however, the Court has announced new procedural rules in a variety of 
areas,193 many of which would have had significant impact in habeas 
proceedings in capital cases. For instance, in Ring v. Arizona, the Court 
held unconstitutional Arizona’s capital statute because it permitted judges, 
rather than juries, to make findings of fact necessary to make the defendant 
death eligible, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.194 Two 
years later, the Court held that Ring announced a new procedural rule that 
did not apply to convictions already final when it issued Ring.195 
Similarly, in Simmons v. South Carolina, the plurality opined that if 
the State argues future dangerousness, and if life without parole is the only 
alternative to a death sentence, then capital defendants have a right to a jury 
instruction that the defendant will be sentenced to life without parole if not 
sentenced to death.196 Three years later, the Court held that Simmons 
announced a new procedural rule not retroactively applicable to convictions 
that had become final before its announcement.197 The Court’s holding in 
Caldwell v. Mississippi—that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing 
the death penalty when the jury is led to believe that it is not responsible for 
the ultimate decision because an appellate court would review the sentence 
for correctness198—faced a similar fate. Despite the fact that the Caldwell 
rule was intended to “enhance[] . . . the accuracy of capital sentencing,” the 
Court pronounced it a new, non-watershed procedural rule that did not 
 
Commonwealth v. Banks, 29 A.3d 1129, 1131 (Pa. 2011). After a weeklong hearing, a trial judge found 
Banks incompetent to be executed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted those findings. Id.  
192 The Court denied certiorari on Banks’s direct appeal on October 5, 1987, Banks v. 
Pennsylvania, 484 U.S. 873, 873–74 (1987), and eight months and one day later, the Court decided 
Mills.  
193 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation 
Clause prohibits the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarant is unavailable 
as a witness and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (holding that any fact, other than a prior conviction, sufficient to increase 
punishment beyond the state sentencing guidelines’ maximum must be proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that any fact required to impose 
a death sentence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury). 
194 536 U.S. at 589, 597. 
195 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004). Perhaps the most controversial part of Schriro 
was its conclusion that Ring announced a new rule, even though Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), largely had dictated the Court’s Ring conclusion. See, e.g., Katharine A. Ferguson, Note, The 
Clash of Ring v. Arizona and Teague v. Lane: An Illustration of the Inapplicability of Modern Habeas 
Retroactivity Jurisprudence in the Capital Sentencing Context, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1036 (2005); 
Marc E. Johnson, Note, Everything Old Is New Again: Justice Scalia’s Activist Originalism in Schriro 
v. Summerlin, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 763, 799–800 (2005). 
196 512 U.S. 154, 161–62 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
197 O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 166–67 (1997). 
198 472 U.S. 320, 328–29 (1985). 
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apply retroactively.199 As a result, capital habeas applicants whose 
sentencing proceedings violated the Constitution under Caldwell have no 
remedy for that constitutional error.200 
To be sure, the criticism that Teague unfairly treats defendants 
differently based only on the relatively random date on which their 
convictions become final may carry little weight with those who view 
habeas only as a mechanism to ensure the state provides adequate process 
for correcting constitutional violations, rather than as a means for 
correcting all constitutional errors.201 But limiting habeas only to ensuring 
adequate state processes is completely inconsistent with the historical 
equitable nature of the habeas remedy. After all, as Professor Halliday’s 
careful history of habeas demonstrates, the remedy was designed to hear 
the “sighs” of all prisoners.202 And of greater concern, the Teague rule—a 
rule that clearly has an impact on many of the most serious cases—is not 
grounded in the equitable principles that guide the other gatekeeping bars. 
So we turn now to the Teague rule’s incompatibility with equity. 
C. The Anomalous and Inequitable Nature of the Teague Rule 
Unlike the other bars on habeas relief, the Teague retroactivity rule 
cannot be justified on equitable grounds. None of the traditional equity 
defenses—availability of relief at law, unclean hands, laches, or estoppel—
even arguably correlate with the Teague doctrine. In addition, in contrast to 
the other four gatekeeping doctrines, the applicant’s conduct has no bearing 
on the application of the retroactivity bar.203 For instance, an applicant who 
has diligently presented his claim to the state court and timely filed his 
petition in federal court still cannot obtain relief for any claim that requires 
 
199 Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 244–45 (1990). 
200 The Teague retroactivity bar does not focus on whether the state violated the applicant’s 
constitutional rights but instead whether “a violation of the right that occurred prior to the 
announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought.” Danforth v. 
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008). In other words, the Teague bar relates to the absence of a remedy, 
not the absence of a right. See id. at 291 (“A decision by this Court that a new rule does not apply 
retroactively under Teague does not imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at 
the time of trial—only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts.”). This is so because 
the source of new constitutional rules is the Constitution itself, not any inherent power of the Court to 
create new rules. “Accordingly, the underlying right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the new 
rule.” Id. at 271. 
201 Professor Paul Bator is probably the best known advocate of the state process view. See, e.g., 
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. 
REV. 441 (1963). Many have studied the conflict between these two views of habeas. See, e.g., Ann 
Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 577 (1993) (discussing the two competing 
models of habeas corpus review: the “full-review” model under which courts should fully review any 
properly preserved constitutional claims and the “institutional competence” model restricting habeas 
review where the applicant had a “‘full and fair’ opportunity” to present claims in state court). 
202 HALLIDAY, supra note 22, at 7. 
203 See supra Part II.B. 
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any extension of the Supreme Court’s federal constitutional procedural 
rules. He has not unreasonably delayed, he has no remedy under the state 
court system, and he has raised the argument at every reasonably available 
opportunity. Put simply, retroactivity falls completely outside both the 
equitable defenses and the equitable justifications that underlie the other 
four procedural bars.204 
Unlike the four habeas bars discussed above, moreover, the Teague 
rule has no individualized exception.205 As discussed above,206 the Court in 
Teague recognized only two “exceptions,” neither of which gives 
individualized consideration to the claim presented. The first—permitting 
retroactive application of substantive rules—has nothing to do with 
differentiating claims based upon equitable considerations such as the 
applicant’s conduct. Indeed, the specialized treatment of substantive rulings 
is not an exception—much less an equitable exception—to the Teague rule 
at all. As the Court itself has recognized: “[Although this Court has] 
sometimes referred to [substantive] rules . . . as falling under an exception 
to Teague’s bar on retroactive application of procedural rules, they are 
more accurately characterized as substantive rules not subject to the bar.”207 
The broader point is that neither the Teague rule nor its substantive rule 
“exception” has anything to do with equitable consideration of the 
applicant’s own delay, forfeiture of claims, or repetitive use of the writ. 
Teague involves only a technical decision about whether a new rule is 
“procedural” or “substantive.”208 Such a categorization has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the applicant’s conduct and the equities to which 
that conduct gives rise. 
Nor does the second Teague “exception”—for watershed rules of 
criminal procedure—provide individualized consideration. Indeed the 
Court not only applies it categorically for each new rule, with no 
consideration of the merits of individual claims, but the Court has never 
found a rule that meets its criteria. In order to decide whether a new rule is 
 
204 The Court has justified its Teague rule by invoking other equitable considerations such as 
judicial economy, but it has never claimed that its rule falls within any of the traditional equitable 
defenses. See supra Part III.A. 
205 The one individualized exception that might apply provides relief if the applicant can 
demonstrate that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 
actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); accord Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 
333, 339–40 (1992). As discussed above, however, this exception provides relief to virtually (or 
perhaps actually) no applicants. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. The Court, moreover, has 
never recognized it as an exception to the Teague bar. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1787 n.376 (1998) (hypothesizing a reason the Court might decide to apply the 
exception to Teague in the future).  
206 See supra Part III.A. 
207 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 n.4 (2004) (citation omitted). Indeed, if substantive 
rules are an “exception” to the Teague bar, so too would be relying on cases that did not announce a 
“new” rule.  
208 See supra Part III.A. 
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“watershed,” the Court does consider whether the rule is “necessary to 
prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction,”209 but the 
Court has been clear that the fact that a particular new rule enhances the 
accuracy of the proceedings or might enhance accuracy in a particular case 
does not suffice.210 Instead, a qualifying rule must be necessary to prevent 
“an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction”211 in general—as 
opposed to serving to prevent an inaccurate conviction in an individual 
case. Thus, far from creating an individualized exception to the Teague rule 
based upon the applicant’s behavior or the strength of his claim, the 
watershed rule exception constitutes only a generalized judgment regarding 
the fundamental nature of the rule. As discussed above, moreover, the 
Court has expressed great skepticism that a new rule could ever be 
“watershed,” calling into question whether this creates an exception at 
all.212 Thus, neither the Teague rule nor either of its “exceptions” is marked 
by any of the equitable characteristics that animate the other gatekeeping 
habeas requirements. 
IV. EQUITY AND NONRETROACTIVITY REVISITED 
What should be done about the equitable outlier status of the Teague 
nonretroactivity rule? The Supreme Court could, of course, overrule 
Teague and eliminate the retroactivity bar, thereby bringing habeas 
doctrine back in line with its equitable origins. But to state it mildly, the 
chance of the Court doing that ranges from exceedingly slim to none. 
Although Teague has been the subject of excoriating criticism since 
 
209 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). To qualify 
as a watershed rule of criminal procedure, the rule also “must alter our understanding of the bedrock 
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
210 See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 419–20 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(“But because [a]ll of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence concerning capital sentencing is directed 
toward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense, the fact that a new rule removes 
some remote possibility of arbitrary infliction of the death sentence does not suffice to bring it within 
Teague’s second exception.” (alteration in original)). 
211 Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418; see, e.g., id. at 419–20 (comparing the rules of Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963), to 
demonstrate why the rule in Crawford does not represent a watershed rule); Schriro, 542 U.S. at 355–56 
(reasoning that because the right to a jury trial has been given a “mixed reception” in foreign countries, 
judicial factfinding is unlikely to so seriously diminish accuracy as to produce an impermissibly large 
risk of injustice, and the rule of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603–09 (2002), requiring jury 
factfinding, cannot be a watershed rule of procedure). 
212 See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (stating that the class of rules qualifying as watershed rules of 
criminal procedure is “extremely narrow, and ‘it is unlikely that any . . . ha[s] yet to emerge’” 
(alteration and omission in original) (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n.7 (2001))); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. 
L. REV. 1731, 1817 (1991) (criticizing the narrowness of Teague’s exceptions); Jason Mazzone, When 
the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 1018 (2010) (observing that Gideon is the 
only rule recognized to date as a watershed rule); supra Part III.A.  
108:139 (2014) Reclaiming the Equitable Heritage of Habeas 
173 
immediately after the decision,213 none of that criticism appears to have 
moved the Court in the slightest to overrule it. 
The Court could, however, explore a more modest alternative. In 
keeping with the principles that govern every other habeas gatekeeping 
doctrine, the Court could ease the rigidity of the Teague rule by permitting 
equitable exceptions to its operation in individual cases. The Court 
certainly has the authority to restore equity by fashioning individualized 
equitable exceptions. Particularly given the Court’s recent recognition of 
the importance of equitable considerations in setting the rules of habeas, 
this appears to be the perfect opportunity for the Court to consider 
equitable exceptions to the Teague nonretroactivity rule.214 It should 
exercise its authority to adopt equitable exceptions both because 
individualized exceptions would mitigate Teague’s most inequitable 
characteristics and because it could do so at little cost to the finality and 
manageability concerns that the Court has invoked in support of Teague. 
A. Restoring Equity 
To introduce equity to the Teague rule, the Court should devise 
equitable exceptions to the general retroactivity bar that would match the 
equitable considerations that run through the other gatekeeping bars. The 
precise content and operation of these exceptions could take a variety of 
forms and will only be set forth generally below, but three equitable 
considerations should govern their development. The first should be 
formulated in keeping with equity’s focus on the conduct of the applicant 
and the exceptions to the other bars that take account of the applicant’s 
conduct. Specifically, the Court should consider the extent to which the 
applicant has diligently raised the claim in state proceedings even prior to 
the Court’s announcement of the new rule. The second exception should 
depend on the magnitude of the applicant’s interest in the new rule’s 
retroactive application. Finally, in keeping with the equitable tradition of 
providing a remedy where no other remedy is available, the Court should 
provide an exception to consider arguments for new rules that can only be 
 
213 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to Its Logical Extreme: A Comment on Teague v. Lane, 
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2453, 2453 (1993) (describing Teague as a “decision which, on many levels, 
concerns the failure of judges to take responsibility for their decisions”); Fallon, Jr. & Meltzer, supra 
note 212, at 1816 (concluding that “Teague’s specific application is both unpersuasive and troubling”); 
Barry Friedman, Pas De Deux: The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2467, 
2496 & n.143 (1993) (arguing that Teague is “painfully disingenuous” and that, as applied, it is 
“completely incoherent and a serious waste of time” and ought to be overruled).  
214 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. The source of the Court’s resurgent interest in equity 
may well be attributable to its invocation of equitable principles in the pre-conviction habeas cases that 
have landed before the Court as a result of the Guantanamo Bay prosecutions. Regardless of the source, 
the Court has increasingly invoked traditional principles of equity in its post-conviction habeas 
jurisprudence. Id. 
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considered on habeas.215 An ameliorative doctrine that takes account of 
these considerations would restore at least a modicum of equity to the 
Court’s retroactivity doctrine. 
The one potential barrier to consideration of claims that meet any 
exception the Court may create is AEDPA’s prohibition on granting relief 
on a claim that the state court adjudicated on the merits unless the state 
court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”216 The Court has 
interpreted this statutory provision to mean that the law must have been 
“clearly established” at the time of the last state court decision on the 
merits.217 It has not, however, decided whether cases that fall within a 
Teague “exception” should be treated differently, i.e., whether, assuming 
that a Teague exception applies, the law need only be “clearly established” 
at the time the federal court considers the habeas application or needs to be 
clearly established at the time the state court considered the issue. In order 
for applicants to obtain relief under new rules falling within the proposed 
exceptions detailed below, the Court should conclude that Greene does not 
apply to Teague exceptions. For the limited number of cases falling within 
one of the proposed exceptions, courts instead should assess whether the 
rule was “clearly established” immediately after the Supreme Court’s new 
ruling. 
1. Providing Relief for Blameless Applicants.—Permitting 
retroactive application of new rules when the applicant’s conduct in 
pursuing his claim has been blameless goes to the core of equity.218 In 
particular, where the applicant has diligently pursued the claim before the 
state courts and those courts have ruled on the merits of that claim, no fault 
can be attributed to the applicant.219 To be sure, if the state court’s 
 
215 See Jackson v. Johnson, 217 F.3d 360, 364 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing an additional exception 
to Teague’s bar “[w]hen an alleged constitutional right is susceptible of vindication only on habeas 
review”). 
216 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
217 See Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 n.*, 45 (2011) (holding that under § 2254(d)(1), the law 
must have been “clearly established” as of the time the state court issued its ruling). Although in some 
ways § 2254(d)(1) and Teague address a similar issue—namely, the extent to which state courts should 
have anticipated any new case decided by the Supreme Court—the Court has been quite clear that the 
inquiries are separate. See id. at 44 (“We have explained that AEDPA did not codify Teague, and that 
‘the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct.’” (quoting Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (per 
curiam))).  
218 See supra Part II.B.  
219 To a certain extent, an applicant who seeks habeas relief under a new rule at the first 
opportunity after the new rule cannot be completely faulted, since he may have had no way of knowing 
prior to the Court’s decision that the rule would change. Even so, the applicant who raised the issue 
before the state courts in an effort to get relief has a stronger equitable claim than the applicant who did 
not, because he has done everything in his power to have the claim heard.  
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consideration of the issue preceded the Supreme Court’s announcement of 
the new constitutional rule, no fault can be attributed to the actions of that 
court. But the habeas remedy historically has been available in certain 
situations even if the state court has not acted in a blameworthy way. 
Perhaps the clearest example is the Court’s holding that new constitutional 
rules apply to all defendants whose convictions were not final prior to the 
issuance of the Court’s decision.220 If, for instance, the defendant completed 
state court proceedings prior to the new rule and the state courts decided 
the case under then-existing precedent, but the time for seeking certiorari to 
the Court had not yet run by the time the Court issued the new rule, habeas 
relief under the new rule would be available to the applicant in spite of the 
blamelessness of the state courts’ rulings. Providing an exception for 
applicants who have preserved a claim throughout the course of the 
proceedings would recognize that faultless applicants should not be 
punished for the happenstance of timing, in contrast to the harsh reality of 
the Teague rule as it stands. 
An example serves to illustrate this point. In Bintz v. Bertrand,221 a jury 
convicted Robert Bintz of murder in 2000 after the State introduced 
hearsay evidence including two statements challenged on direct appeal: 
(1) testimony that the defendant’s brother, David, had told police that both 
he and Robert had been at the scene of the murder on the night in question, 
and (2) testimony from David’s trial by Gary Swendby, David’s former 
cellmate, quoting statements that David made to Swendby indicating that 
Robert played the primary role in the murder.222 At trial and on appeal in 
2001, Robert Bintz challenged the admissibility of both of these statements 
on grounds that their admission deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right 
to confront witnesses against him, since neither David nor Swendby 
testified at his trial. Both the state trial court and the appellate court denied 
Bintz’s claims,223 concluding that admission of the statements did not 
violate the then-applicable Confrontation rule.224 Three years later, while 
Bintz’s federal habeas claim challenging the admissibility of this evidence 
under the Confrontation Clause was pending, the Supreme Court held in 
Crawford v. Washington that the Confrontation Clause forbids the 
admission of “testimonial” statements against the defendant unless he had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.225 
 
220 See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding that new constitutional rules apply 
to all cases not yet final at the time the Court issued the decision setting forth the new constitutional 
rule). 
221 403 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2005). 
222 Id. at 861–62. Swendby had died by the time of Robert Bintz’s trial. Id. at 862. 
223 Id. at 862. 
224 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that admission of hearsay statements 
either falling within “firmly rooted” exceptions or demonstrating particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness do not violate the Confrontation Clause). 
225 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
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The precise definition of “testimonial” under Crawford remains 
subject to some debate, but it has been clear from the time Crawford was 
decided that a formal police interview like that between David and the 
police constitutes a testimonial assertion226 and that Swendby’s testimony at 
the trial of Bintz’s brother was “testimonial.” Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine a statement more “testimonial” than a witness’s testimony from 
another criminal trial.227 
At every step of the process, Robert Bintz raised, preserved, and 
litigated the claim that admission of these statements violated his rights 
under the Confrontation Clause. And the state courts addressed the merits 
of his claims.228 As it turns out, the state courts were wrong and Robert 
Bintz was right—the statements were testimonial and their admission 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. 
But because the Court issued the opinion in Crawford after Bintz’s time for 
seeking certiorari on direct appeal passed, Teague barred any relief.229 
For an applicant like Bintz, who makes every effort to present a 
particular claim of constitutional error to the state courts, and who would 
prevail but for the accident of timing and the Supreme Court’s decision to 
deny his petition and accept a different case on certiorari, it seems not only 
inconsistent with fundamental notions of equity but also manifestly unfair 
to deny a remedy. The Court should rectify that unfairness by adopting an 
equitable exception to Teague’s retroactivity bar for claims, presented to 
state courts prior to the Court’s announcement of the new rule, that are 
meritorious under the new rule. 
2. Formulating an Exception to Correct the Most Significant 
Errors.—Just as providing an exception for blameless conduct 
imports equitable principles into the retroactivity doctrine, so too does 
providing a remedy where the constitutional error had the most significant 
impact on the applicant. Indeed, equity courts arose for the very purpose of 
remedying claims of strong perceived injustices that could not be addressed 
in courts of law because of the mechanical operation of the rules of those 
courts.230 Of course, there is no way to precisely measure the significance of 
 
226 See id. at 52 (“Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also 
testimonial under even a narrow standard.”).  
227 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836–37 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing for a narrower definition of “testimonial” that would cover only formalized 
materials such as “[a]ffidavits, depositions, and prior testimony”).  
228 Bintz, 403 F.3d at 862–63. 
229 See id. at 865–67 (analyzing Crawford under the Teague framework and finding that it does not 
fit under either of the “exceptions”).  
230 See Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 
753, 756 (1945) (footnote omitted) (“[According to Blackstone,] [e]quity exists . . . for the correction of 
situations ‘wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient.’ By ‘the law,’ Blackstone meant 
the common law as administered under common law processes . . . .”); Christopher L. McCall, 
Comment, Equity up in Smoke: Civil RICO, Disgorgement, and United States v. Philip Morris, 
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harm resulting from constitutional error. But the Supreme Court might 
fashion such an exception to the Teague rule by balancing factors related to 
the applicant’s claim against the state’s interest in finality. These factors 
should include an assessment of the strength of the applicant’s argument 
that there was error under the new rule, the extent to which that error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the severity of the resulting 
penalty. What follows is one possible method for weighing those interests. 
As the Court has repeatedly emphasized, the state has an interest in 
finality in every habeas case.231 The Court therefore could create a Teague 
exception that requires applicants to make a threshold showing that the 
alleged constitutional error in fact is an error under the new rule, that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings, and that the penalty imposed 
was serious. Because this is a balancing standard, these factors would fall 
across a continuum.232 So, for instance, if an applicant had a very strong 
claim that there was constitutional error that affected the outcome of his 
proceedings, he might be able to establish his interest even if his sentence 
was ten years, rather than life or death. And an applicant sentenced to death 
might meet this test even if his claims on the merits are slightly weaker. If 
the applicant cannot make the threshold showing (and his case does not fall 
within one of the other exceptions), Teague would preclude retroactive 
application of the new constitutional rule. If, however, the applicant 
establishes these factors, the presumption would be that his claim falls 
within the equitable exception, and the new rule applies unless the state has 
an additional interest in nonretroactivity (besides finality and comity) that 
outweighs the applicant’s interest. 
The first factor—the strength of the applicant’s argument that there 
was error under the new rule—would require the federal habeas court to 
evaluate the merits of his claim, imposing some burden on the court. But 
 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2461, 2472–73 (2006) (noting that courts of chancery were created because 
“many meritorious claims were barred from proceeding by the rigidity of the law courts,” which limited 
relief to very specific categories of cases); cf. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495–96 (1986) (noting 
that, in extraordinary cases, courts may hear and grant a habeas claim despite an applicable limitation 
and without a showing of cause and prejudice, when they can determine that a constitutional violation 
probably has resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent). 
231 See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 291 (2008) (“It is fully consistent with a 
government of laws to recognize that the finality of a judgment may bar relief.”); Beard v. Banks, 542 
U.S. 406, 413 (2004) (“[T]he Teague principle protects not only the reasonable judgments of state 
courts but also the States’ interest in finality quite apart from their courts.”); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 
227, 234 (1990) (“The principle announced in Teague serves to ensure that gradual developments in the 
law over which reasonable jurists may disagree are not later used to upset the finality of state 
convictions valid when entered.”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion) (“[W]e have recognized that [the] interest[ ] of . . . finality must also be considered in 
determining the proper scope of habeas review.”). 
232 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 
948 (1987) (noting that “ad hoc” balancing, defined as balancing of the interests in a particular case, 
may accord different weight to interests in different cases).  
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this small burden should not preclude this factor. There was a long tradition 
of equitable courts assessing the strength of claims presented by petitioners, 
even if the equitable court had no jurisdiction over those claims.233 In 
addition, as a practical matter, federal habeas courts—both district courts 
and courts of appeals—often assess the merits of the applicant’s claim as 
an alternative basis for their rulings,234 so this would not require 
substantially more work than habeas courts already undertake. 
The second factor requires the court to assess the impact of the 
constitutional error on the outcome of the proceedings. Federal habeas 
courts have a long history of evaluating the extent to which a particular 
constitutional error affected the scope of the proceedings.235 Given that 
experience, the Court could easily fashion a standard that would ensure that 
only the most meritorious claims receive the benefit of retroactivity. For 
instance, the Court could use the harmless error standard that applies to 
constitutional error identified on habeas review. This standard precludes 
relief unless the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury’s verdict.”236 The precise content of the standard has 
been the subject of some dispute within the Court, primarily because the 
Court has offered conflicting opinions regarding whether the standard 
properly should focus on the jury’s verdict and the extent to which the 
constitutional error affected it,237 or on the strength of the other untainted 
evidence presented at trial and the likelihood that another jury would reach 
the same conclusion even absent the constitutional error.238 This dispute 
 
233 See John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 529–30 
(1978) (describing how early equity courts “became accustomed to assessing the probable strength of 
the plaintiff’s underlying claim” while still remaining reluctant to approach the merits of the underlying 
legal claim). 
234 See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 67–69 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (reaching the issue of 
whether the Sixth Amendment requires reversal of convictions when the public was denied access to 
testimony during trial in spite of the fact that applicants were seeking to have the court adopt a new 
rule). 
235 See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (applying a version of the harmless 
error standard in habeas claims based on constitutional error); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 335–36 
(1992) (requiring a strong showing of “actual innocence” where habeas applicants are procedurally 
barred from raising their claims and cannot show cause and prejudice); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 
72, 87 (1977) (applying the traditional cause and prejudice rule to procedurally defaulted habeas 
claims). 
236 See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added) (adopting the harmless error standard articulated 
in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). This version of the harmless error standard 
represents a more significant hurdle to applicants than the standard that applies to constitutional error on 
direct review—which requires a court to set aside the conviction unless it finds the error harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
237 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(noting that the harmless error analysis should “look[ ] . . . to the basis on which the jury actually rested 
its verdict”).  
238 See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (arguing that this inquiry best balances 
the interests at stake in habeas cases).  
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notwithstanding, the harmless error standard continues to apply in habeas 
cases, and federal courts have significant experience applying it.239 
This standard also appears to screen all but the most compelling 
claims. Indeed, according to one influential study tracking the success rates 
of federal habeas cases, in only 4 out of 267 capital cases (less than 1.5%) 
and 4 out of more than 2000 noncapital cases (less than 0.17%) did the 
district court find the alleged constitutional error not harmless.240 Thus, the 
harmless error standard ensures that relief is reserved for the most 
significant claims of constitutional error. 
The final factor on the applicant’s side of the balancing—the penalty 
imposed—would be relatively straightforward to consider in the analysis. 
To put it simply, given equivalently strong arguments that constitutional 
error affected the outcome of proceedings, applicants sentenced to death or 
life without parole241 would be much more likely to obtain retroactive 
application of a new rule than applicants sentenced to terms of several 
years.242 As others have recognized, it is a far different thing to subject an 
individual to a death sentence or life imprisonment on legally dubious 
grounds than to, for example, subject that person to a monetary fine or the 
loss of a subsidy.243 Equity, in short, concerns itself with proportionality. 
Thus, the more severe the punishment imposed, the stronger the case to 
temper Teague’s otherwise wooden rule. Death penalty cases and those 
involving significant terms of incarceration already constitute the bulk of 
the federal habeas docket,244 and adopting a penalty-sensitive approach to 
the balancing therefore likely would not result in significantly increased 
habeas filings. 
 
239 See, e.g., Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121–22 (2007) (affirming that the Brecht standard applies 
to all habeas harmless error cases regardless of whether the lower state court used the traditional 
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 4–5 (1996) (per 
curiam) (remanding case for lower court to apply the Brecht standard and emphasizing that it applies to 
all habeas claims related to “trial errors”); O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995) (applying the 
Brecht harmless error standard and finding that when a judge “is in grave doubt” as to whether it is met, 
“that error is not harmless”). 
240 KING ET AL., supra note 17, at 50, 52. The study tracked only explicit findings that an error was 
not harmless, not cases concluding that the error was harmless. Id. at 63.  
241 THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BULLETIN: FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE 
URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 12–13 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf 
(presenting data about sentencing patterns for persons convicted of various felonies). 
242 The Court has repeatedly recognized that “death is different.” See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991) (upholding mandatory sentences of life imprisonment even though the Eighth 
Amendment requires discretion in death cases).  
243 See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the 
First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV 991, 999–1000 (2012) (noting the importance of severity of the 
penalty for purposes of determining First Amendment violations).  
244 KING ET AL., supra note 17, at 19–20 (noting in a study of federal habeas applicants that, of 
those noncapital applicants for whom information on sentencing in state court was provided, “27.7% 
were serving life sentences [and o]f the remainder, the average sentence being served was 20 years” and 
“[o]nly 12% of those with a term of years were serving five years or less”).  
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On the State’s side of the balancing, the State always has an interest in 
ensuring finality of convictions. And that interest would be sufficient to 
outweigh the applicant’s interests if the applicant could not make a 
sufficient showing on the factors described above. If the court deemed the 
applicant’s claim sufficiently compelling to overcome the State’s interest in 
finality, however, the State then could identify any additional interests 
specific to the applicant’s case, including, for example, that a long period 
of time elapsed since conviction, making retrial impossible. If the State 
articulated specific additional interests in finality, the trial court then would 
have to include those interests in the balance. 
An example illustrates the point. Recall Robert Bintz, the defendant 
against whom the State introduced a number of out-of-court statements, 
including (1) a confession to law enforcement officers given by his brother, 
David, and (2) testimony that David’s cellmate had given at David’s trial.245 
As discussed above, Bintz had a strong claim that Crawford v. Washington 
would have prohibited admission of these two statements if it had 
applied.246 And he was sentenced to life in prison as a result of his 
conviction.247 Two of the three factors—the strength of Bintz’s claim and 
the magnitude of the penalty—therefore weigh strongly in favor of 
retroactive application of Crawford. The last factor is subject to more 
argument. After all, the disputed testimony, from the mouth of his brother, 
arguably provided significantly damning evidence against Bintz. On the 
other hand, the disputed evidence arguably was cumulative.248 But the other 
two factors arguably would have outweighed the strength of the evidence. 
Bintz therefore would have had a strong case that he met a threshold 
showing necessary for retroactive application of Crawford. 
The State might, of course, have had significant arguments against 
retroactivity. In particular, although less than a year and a half passed 
between the time Bintz’s conviction became final and the Court’s decision 
in Crawford, the time between the conviction and habeas petition was 
relatively significant, which gave the State an argument that it had a 
significant interest in finality. That fact notwithstanding, Bintz likely had a 
strong argument that he was entitled to retroactive application of Crawford 
under this standard. 
 
245 See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text.  
246 See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text. The Government’s best argument that 
Swendby’s testimony was admissible probably would be that Swendby testified at Bintz’s preliminary 
hearing, so Bintz presumably had at least some opportunity to cross-examine him then. See Bintz v. 
Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that a joint preliminary hearing was held). 
247 See State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002), abrogated by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
248 See Bintz, 403 F.3d at 869 (holding that even if admission of either of the statements was 
constitutional error, it would be harmless because other evidence corroborated it). The admission of at 
least some of that other evidence arguably violated Bintz’s Confrontation Clause rights, but the Court 
held that Bintz procedurally defaulted those claims. Id. at 863–64.  
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Under this proposed standard, there will, of course, be many cases 
where the applicant has only a weak claim of constitutional error under the 
new rule, and the argument for retroactive application therefore will fail 
with little effort by the courts. And there also will be cases in which the 
applicant has little to no argument that error under the new rule affected the 
outcome of his case, and the courts can easily conclude that the new rule 
does not apply retroactively. 
Admittedly, this standard will also give rise to more difficult 
questions. Beard v. Banks249 represents just such a case. Recall that Banks, 
sentenced to death, argued that he would not have been sentenced to death 
if a new constitutional rule—holding that the state cannot require 
unanimity as to mitigating factors250—had applied to his case.251 Banks 
certainly convinced the Third Circuit that the jury instructions and verdict 
form used in his case violated the rule announced in Mills.252 But the State 
had a strong argument that nothing in the proceedings violated the rule 
announced in Mills and that even if it did, the jury’s verdict was not 
affected by that error. And of course, Banks was a capital case, further 
raising the stakes. Cases like Banks would require significant thought and 
effort by the courts to assess the applicant’s (and the State’s) interests in 
retroactivity or nonretroactivity, and it is not at all clear whether Banks 
would qualify for the proposed exception. But it is fair to say that such 
effort is justified in cases involving the most significant penalties, and, in 
fact, the courts in Banks appear to have devoted significant time and 
thought to the case, even in the absence of a Teague exception. In short, 
this exception may require some work on the part of federal habeas courts, 
but that effort ensures that applicants get individual consideration of their 
claims and ultimately that habeas remains true to its equitable origins. 
3. The “No-Forum” Exception.—Finally, the Supreme Court should 
adopt an exception to Teague’s nonretroactivity rule so that federal habeas 
courts can consider arguments for new federal constitutional rules that 
cannot (and could never) be decided in any other forum. Such an exception 
would reflect the extraordinary nature of the equitable remedy of the writ 
of habeas corpus and the fact that it was designed to remediate errors for 
which there are no other remedies.253 
Teague effectively prohibits the Court from even considering whether 
to adopt a new procedural rule in a habeas case. The Court cannot 
announce such a rule in a habeas case, no matter how well-preserved and 
 
249 542 U.S. 406 (2004). 
250 Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988).  
251 See supra notes 176–92 and accompanying text.  
252 See Banks v. Horn, 271 F.3d 527, 551 (3d Cir. 2001). 
253 See supra note 72 (listing cases describing the extraordinary nature of the remedy); supra note 
230 (identifying sources documenting the history of the courts of equity as providing remedies to those 
who had no remedy at law).  
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important the issue, unless it falls within the “watershed rule” 
exception254—an exception, as articulated above, that the Court has never 
used.255 Teague therefore effectively prohibits the Court from adopting any 
new procedural rule that would apply only in habeas proceedings. 
Again, an example illustrates the problem. As the law stands, Teague 
prevents any federal court from deciding that state habeas applicants (or 
any category of them) have a right to counsel in those proceedings. The 
Court held in Coleman v. Thompson that there generally is no right to 
counsel in state post-conviction habeas proceedings.256 It left open, 
however, the question of whether states must appoint counsel in “collateral 
proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance at trial” (so-called “initial-review collateral proceedings”)257 and 
whether capital habeas defendants have a right to counsel in their first 
collateral proceeding (although it has strongly indicated that they do not).258 
If the Court wanted to revisit the right to counsel in initial-review collateral 
proceedings or capital defendants’ right to counsel for first habeas 
proceedings, it does not appear that the Court could reach either issue in 
any proceeding. After all, any rule providing such a right would be a new 
rule and thus would be barred by Teague.259 And because the claimed right 
by its nature would apply only on collateral review, defendants on direct 
review would lack standing to raise this issue.260 Thus, because the 
conviction of any applicant raising such a claim already would be final 
(and the claim therefore Teague-barred), the result would be that no 
 
254 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“[H]abeas 
corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those 
rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through [the watershed rule 
exception] we have articulated.”); see also Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 
59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 362, 366–67 (1991) (surmising that Teague’s watershed rule exception “is 
arguably not an exception at all” and that because of its confluence with the threshold nature of the 
retroactivity inquiry, “federal habeas corpus would henceforth generally be available only to vindicate 
constitutional rights already clearly in existence”). 
255 See supra Part III.A. 
256 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); accord Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).  
257 Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). 
258 See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (concluding, in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 action, that “meaningful access to the courts” requirements, set forth in Bounds v. Smith, 430 
U.S. 817 (1977), do not require appointment of counsel in capital cases because the Finley rule “should 
apply no differently in capital cases than in noncapital cases”); id. at 14–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (suggesting that the Constitution does not require states to provide counsel to all capital 
defendants on habeas review). 
259 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“[A] case announces a new rule 
when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. . . . 
[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the 
defendant’s conviction became final.”). 
260 See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130–34 (2004) (denying claim by attorneys based 
on hypothetical future arguments because of an absence of general and third-party standing). 
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defendant—and, in particular, no habeas applicant—could bring the issue 
before the Court.261 
In this way, Teague has fundamentally altered the Court’s institutional 
role as the final arbiter of federal constitutional rights by restricting the 
Court’s ability to reach, in any case, issues related to applicants’ federal 
constitutional rights. This is so because Teague not only prevents the Court 
from reaching the issue in a federal habeas proceeding, but also precludes 
the Court from reaching the issue on certiorari from a state habeas 
proceeding. If, for example, an applicant seeks state (rather than federal) 
habeas relief, arguing that the federal Constitution gives capital defendants 
a right to counsel in first habeas proceedings, the state court conclusion that 
there is no such right cannot be challenged either on direct review to the 
Supreme Court or by way of federal habeas. The difficulty is that such a 
claim arises only in collateral proceedings, and Teague therefore forecloses 
any consideration of the state court’s ruling that would produce a “new 
rule.” 
As a practical matter, the Teague-barred claims in this category will 
relate to a limited category of cases: (1) right to counsel in certain types of 
collateral proceedings, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at stages of 
direct review that result in a denial of certiorari (and thus a final 
conviction),262 (3) constitutional claims related to the Court’s certiorari 
process on direct review, or (4) other constitutional rights of applicants 
either on state or federal habeas. The absence of any forum to consider 
these issues, and the concomitant absence of any mechanism for the Court 
ever to do so, argues in favor of the creation of an exception for this 
category of cases. 
 
261 The Court recently confronted this issue regarding the right to counsel on initial-review 
collateral proceedings. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319. As discussed supra Part II.C, the Court in Martinez 
refused to decide whether applicants have such a constitutional right, instead holding that as an 
equitable matter, the failure to appoint counsel in those proceedings could constitute cause to excuse 
procedural default. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. And given the Teague rule, it does 
not appear that the Court could have reached the constitutional issue. See Respondent’s Brief on the 
Merits at 36–41, Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001), 2011 WL 3947554, at *36–41. Of course, 
the Court’s holding may open the door for the Court to reach the constitutional issue. There now would 
be a much stronger argument that any determination of the constitutional right to counsel in these 
proceedings would not be a “new rule.” But the combination of the Court’s broad definition of “new 
rules” and its express reservation of the issue in Martinez still might mean that this would constitute a 
new rule, in which case habeas applicants could not use it unless they could successfully argue that it 
represents a “watershed rule.”  
262 The Court has never recognized a right to counsel, and therefore the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, at any “discretionary” stage, which includes petitions for certiorari to the highest 
state court or the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587–88 (1982) (per 
curiam) (rejecting the applicant’s habeas claim that his counsel was ineffective in filing his petition for 
certiorari because he had no constitutional right to counsel at the certiorari filing stage, so “he could not 
be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel” at that time (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 
610 (1974) (rejecting the argument for a right to counsel beyond the direct appeal of right))). 
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Indeed, a court addressing one of those claims developed just such an 
exception. In Jackson v. Johnson, the applicant sought to raise an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the grounds that his counsel on 
direct state appeal failed to file a timely motion for rehearing.263 The Fifth 
Circuit acknowledged that Jackson sought to have the court decide a new 
constitutional rule with respect to the reach of ineffective assistance 
claims.264 But it also recognized that “the constitutional question 
presented . . . could be raised only on collateral review,” and it therefore 
found itself “obliged to give serious consideration to the merits of [the] 
claim,” Teague’s bar notwithstanding.265 Following the lead of the Fifth 
Circuit in Jackson, the Supreme Court should create an exception to 
Teague so that this type of issue can be considered. Indeed, in Jackson v. 
Johnson, the claim for an equitable exception to Teague is particularly 
compelling because without one, there would be no adequate remedy 
anywhere for the allegedly wronged applicant. 
B. The Costs of Equity 
The argument that the Supreme Court should adopt equity-based 
exceptions to the Teague nonretroactivity rule might raise concerns about 
state interests in finality and, especially, judicial efficiency. Although the 
Court emphasized finality interests in Teague,266 concerns about its own 
caseload may have been more urgent. After all, decisions like Blakely v. 
Washington, holding unconstitutional sentencing under guidelines systems 
that permit enhanced sentences based on judicial findings of fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence,267 affect a huge number of cases.268 Indeed, 
the Blakely dissent warned that the Court’s holding, even if applied only 
prospectively, “threatens an untold number of criminal judgments.”269 The 
prospect of thousands of additional cases stemming from applying similar 
 
263 217 F.3d 360, 361 (5th Cir. 2000).  
264 Id. at 363–64. 
265 Id. at 364. 
266 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308–10 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
267 See 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004). 
268 See Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington: Practical 
Implications for State Sentencing Systems, POL’Y & PRAC. REV., Aug. 2004, at 1, 2–6 (noting that 
Blakely’s rule “fundamentally affect[s]” systems in at least thirteen states); Isaac M. Gradman, Note, 
Hot Under the White Collar: What the Rollercoaster in Sentencing Law from Blakely to Booker Will 
Mean to Corporate Offenders, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 731, 740 (2005) (“Thousands of defendants were 
potentially affected by Blakely and its aftershocks.”). 
269 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 323, 324 n.2 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that, in the federal system 
alone, “[o]n March 31, 2004, there were 8,320 federal criminal appeals pending in which the 
defendant’s sentence was at issue”). 
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rulings retroactively may cause the Court sleepless nights and thus help 
reinforce Teague.270 
This concern is overblown for several reasons. First, the Court does 
not create a significant number of new constitutional procedure rules. 
Second, even absent Teague’s retroactivity bar, federal habeas claims still 
would be subject to the limitations discussed above—abuse of the writ, 
exhaustion, the statute of limitations, and procedural default271—as well as 
the very deferential standard of review set forth in AEDPA,272 all of which 
impose significant obstacles to relief.273 Third, most of the Court’s new 
rules would not affect a significant number of cases. For instance, new 
rules related to trial rights would not apply to the 95% of convictions in 
felony cases that result from guilty pleas.274 Similarly, because the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply to habeas cases wholly 
apart from Teague,275 new Fourth Amendment rules would continue not to 
threaten interests in comity, federalism, and finality. Of particular 
importance, making retroactive the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence 
would result in very few additional habeas cases, both because of the 
infrequency of capital sentences276 and because capital defendants very 
likely will file federal habeas applications regardless of whether new rules 
 
270 The Court has not yet decided whether Blakely applies retroactively. See, e.g., Burton v. 
Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 149 (2007) (per curiam) (not addressing the question because the petitioner had 
not complied with the statutory gatekeeping requirements). It has held that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002), also a sentencing-focused rule, does not apply retroactively. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 
U.S. 348, 351–55, 358 (2004). Because the Arizona capital punishment scheme at issue in Ring 
required proof of factors leading to death eligibility beyond a reasonable doubt, Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, 
however, Summerlin does not necessarily dispose of the Blakely retroactivity question. See Stephanos 
Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 333, 337 (2004). 
271 Both the statute of limitations and the statutory abuse of the writ doctrine have exceptions if the 
claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), (d)(1)(C) (2006). As 
a result, these doctrines may not provide significant barriers to retroactive claims. Nonetheless, the 
procedural default doctrine likely would preclude relief in many cases even if the Court made the new 
rule retroactive. 
272 Id. § 2254(d). 
273 Cf. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” supra note 141, at 297 (concluding that 
AEDPA has had less impact than people had predicted, in large part because the Court already had 
significantly limited the habeas remedy). 
274 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation 
Clause requires face-to-face confrontation to offer “testimonial” statements against defendants); see 
also COHEN & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 241, at 10 (noting that 95% of convictions in felony cases 
acquired within one year resulted from guilty pleas).  
275 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–95 (1976). 
276 Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2010–Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., 
Dec. 2011, at 18, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp10st.pdf (reporting a general 
decline in the number of persons sentenced to death in the United States, down to 104 in 2010, 
compared with 224 ten years earlier).  
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apply retroactively.277 Finally, all of these exceptions are quite narrow and 
therefore do not create a risk that even once-in-a-generation cases like 
Blakely would overwhelm the federal habeas system.278 
That leaves, then, only the State’s interest in finality. To be sure, 
permitting exceptions to the Teague bar would allow certain habeas 
applicants to raise additional claims and might increase the number of 
applicants as well. But in considering the interests on both sides, rather 
than only on the State’s side, the balance of equities favors retroactive 
application of new rules in cases that meet these narrow exceptions. As 
discussed above,279 by limiting retroactive application to the most faultless 
applicants and the strongest or most compelling claims, the number of 
potential claims drops significantly, thereby reducing the corresponding 
cost to finality. Limiting retroactive application to those facing the most 
significant penalties or asserting the strongest claims regarding the 
accuracy of the results, moreover, protects both the applicant’s and 
society’s interests in providing habeas relief.280 
CONCLUSION 
The writ of habeas corpus fundamentally and historically is an 
equitable remedy. Operating as an equitable outlier, Teague’s retroactivity 
rule has little justification beyond the general effort to limit availability of 
the habeas remedy. That effort, however, neither acknowledges the 
equitable nature of the habeas remedy nor provides an adequate 
justification for the far-reaching sweep of Teague’s rule. The Supreme 
Court therefore should adopt exceptions to its broad coverage that link the 
retroactivity bar to equitable norms that inform every other area of habeas 
law. 
 
277 See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, at 5–6 
(June 12, 2000) (unpublished study), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionnalservices/
liebman/ (finding that 40% of death judgments reviewed on federal habeas between 1973 and 1995 
were set aside); see also VICTOR E. FLANGO, STATE JUSTICE INST., HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS 10 (1994), available at http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/
criminal/id/0 (showing a general uptick in the number of federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners 
between 1941 and 1991).  
278 The other rule that arguably affects as many cases as Blakely is the Court’s holding in Padilla v. 
Kentucky that failure to inform a defendant of deportation consequences could constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483–84 (2010). The Court recently accepted certiorari to 
determine whether Padilla constitutes a “new rule” for Teague purposes. See Chaidez v. United States, 
655 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012). 
279 See supra Part IV.A.  
280 See, e.g., State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 266–68 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (refusing to apply 
Teague and holding that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), applied retroactively to capital cases in 
state habeas proceedings because the right to jury trial is a “fundamental right” and because only five 
cases were affected by its holding). The relief in Whitfield was granted on a motion to recall the 
mandate, but the court made clear that the habeas remedy also would have been available. Id. at 269 
n.19.  
